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ABSTRACT 
Enhancing regional collaboration has been identified as one of the eight National 
Priorities for Homeland Security by the president of the United States. While South 
Carolina has made significant efforts in expanding regional collaboration, such as the 
creation of regional Counter Terrorism Coordinating Councils (CTCCs), there is still 
much work to be done. There are several teams and capabilities in place throughout the 
state, but they are uncoordinated, lack structure, and have no plan or strategy by which to 
guide them.  State agencies have different regional operational structures, adding to the 
redundancy and uncoordinated homeland security planning efforts. This thesis examines 
why collaboration is difficult to achieve, and based on an examination of the literature as 
well as the benefits of regional collaboration as observable in other states, will make  
specific recommendations for South Carolina to expand regional collaboration. The 
recommendations are applicable to states throughout the nation to ensure that homeland 
security planning efforts are coordinated, and regional collaboration is expanded at the 
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There is no greater necessity than to collaborate on a regional basis to 
leverage expertise, share specialized assets, enhance capacity, and 
interoperate cohesively and effectively.1  
A. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Enhancing regional collaboration has been identified as one of the eight National 
Priorities for Homeland Security by the president of the United States. It has been 
mandated in the National Preparedness Guidance and again in the State Homeland 
Security Program and Capability Review Guidebook, Volume 1: “The Goal does not 
mandate that State and local governments adopt a regional governmental structure, but it 
does require that all levels of government embrace a regional approach to building 
capabilities.”2,3 In order to build capabilities via regional collaboration, states throughout 
the nation including South Carolina have developed regional councils and advisory 
committees. Specialized response teams have been built out and equipment has been 
strategically placed throughout the regions. The Department of Homeland Security has 
required states to assess current regional structures in an effort to support the 
implementation of the tiered structure of the Target Capabilities List.4 While South 
Carolina has made significant efforts in expanding regional collaboration such as the 
creation of regional Counter Terrorism Coordinating Councils (CTCCs), there is still 
much work to be done. There are several teams and capabilities in place throughout the 
state, but they are uncoordinated, lack structure, and have no plan or strategy by which to 
guide them.  
One of the key means to determine how prepared a county, region, or state should 
be are three questions: “How prepared do we need to be?,” “How prepared are we?,” and 
                                                 
1 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidance (Washington D.C: Department 
of Homeland Security, April 27, 2005), 19.  
2 Ibid., 20. 
3 Department of Homeland Security, State Homeland Security Program and Capability Review 
Guidebook, Volume 1 (Washington D.C: Department of Homeland Security, October 2005), 64. 
4 National Preparedness Guidance, 21. 
2 
“How do we prioritize efforts to close the gap?”5 These questions allow planning teams 
to assess the threat, determine current capabilities, and recommend how to most 
effectively and efficiently close the gap between threat and capability. They can also aid 
state and local governments in determining the structure of the regions, what capabilities 
to enhance, and how to effectively guide planning efforts. These aspects will be revisited 
in the recommendations provided in Chapter V.  
Enhancing regional collaboration is a key component of answering the above 
questions to address target levels of capability and conduct capability-based planning. As 
stated in the National Preparedness Guidance, “expanded regional collaboration supports 
the development of a seamless, national network of mutually-supporting capabilities to 
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the full spectrum of threats and 
hazards.”6 Regional collaboration is important because not every county can 
comprehensively prepare for a natural or man-made event. Communities cannot achieve 
or sustain the same amount of preparedness, nor do they need to. Therefore, enhancing 
regional collaboration is the key to ensuring that adequate levels of preparedness and 
response for all disciplines within homeland security are distributed throughout regions 
within the state. By enhancing regional collaboration, smaller counties can create mutual 
aid agreements or memoranda of understanding, with other counties to offer or receive 
aid in the event of a disaster. Also, enhancing regional collaboration will support 
planning, equipping, training, and exercising for all homeland security issues. 
Although regional collaboration may occur between states, for the purpose of the 
present research it will refer to counties or regions within a state. This thesis will detail 
specific recommendations for South Carolina to enhance regional collaboration that may 
be utilized across the nation. The recommendations will be drawn from the literature on 
the importance of regional collaboration, the impediments to collaboration, and how 
other states have addressed these impediments.   
Section A, provided background information on enhancing regional collaboration, 
why it is worth examining, and how it will be discussed throughout this thesis. Section B, 
National Priority, provides an analysis of enhancing regional collaboration as a national                                                  
5 National Preparedness Guidance, 3. 
6 Ibid., 19.  
3 
priority and its definition, or lack thereof, at a national level. Section C, State Priority,  
briefly describes how regional collaboration has been implemented in South Carolina. 
Section D, Benefits of Regional Collaboration, discusses the benefits of regional 
collaboration and why it is an important National Priority.  Section E, Literature Review, 
examines the literature on enhancing regional collaboration, including not only federal 
mandates, but also documentation available from other states on the benefits of regional 
collaboration, how it has been implemented, and a brief overview of the impediments to 
enhancing it. Section F, Expanding Regional Collaboration, provides a general overview 
of the remainder of the thesis, including why collaboration is important and how three 
states (Iowa, Arizona, and Michigan) are overcoming identified impediments to enhance 
collaboration.  
B. NATIONAL PRIORITY 
“Expand Regional Collaboration” is one of the eight priorities in the Department 
of Homeland Security’s National Preparedness Goal.7 Due to an overall decrease in 
federal funding to support homeland security initiatives and thus the need for more 
effective utilization of that funding, regional collaboration has been encouraged and 
continues to be a priority within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In an 
effort to promote sharing of resources and regional planning, DHS included 
“regionalization and effective collaboration” as part of the scoring criteria for the 2006 
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) funds.8 Although DHS has widely promoted 
regional collaboration, the agency has offered little guidance as to how states and local 
governments should accomplish this task.  
As a national priority, regional collaboration is meant to “tactically locate 
capabilities in order to maximize coverage of the U.S. population and the Nation’s high 
priority critical infrastructure and key resources.”9 Other than Urban Areas Security 
Initiative (UASI) projects, regional collaboration was not initially funded directly by 
DHS. Only in Fiscal Year 2005 did DHS mandate that regional collaboration take place 
                                                 
7 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal (Washington D.C: Department of 
Homeland Security, December 2005), 15. 
8 Department of Homeland Security, FY2006 Homeland Security Grant Program: Investment 
Justification User’s Manual (Washington D.C: Department of Homeland Security, December 2005), 4. 
9 Department of Homeland Security, FY2006 Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidance 
and Application Kit (Washington D.C: Department of Homeland Security, December 2005), 4. 
4 
to create Tactical Interoperable Communication Plans in all states, including those states 
that do not have UASI projects. Until Fiscal Year 2006, the HSGP did not fully support 
DHS’s goal to expand regional collaboration. Pork barrel spending did not mandate that 
regional initiatives be created, supported, or funded. States were given a set amount of 
funding irrespective of whether the state promoted regional efforts. For example, in South 
Carolina, although there were regional initiatives, most of the local portion of funds were 
distributed to the counties based solely on population. Most of the local funds were not 
used for regional initiatives. However, with the switch to a more competitive grant 
program in Fiscal Year 2006, states were judged on how their plans supported expanding 
regional collaboration.  
While the “Goal does not mandate that State and local governments adopt a 
regional governmental structure… it does require that all levels of government embrace a 
regional approach to building capabilities.”10 The term “capabilities” is often thought of 
only in the response sense: equipment. However, expanding regional collaboration is also 
focused on promoting multi-jurisdictional preparedness activities such as planning, 
training, and exercises. Planning throughout the nation is inadequate. As stated in the 
National Plan Review report, “the current status of plans and planning gives grounds for 
significant national concern.”11 Also, the report notes that “Our large homeland security 
community is characterized by divided and decentralized planning responsibilities and 
highly diversified administration.”12 Inadequate planning can also affect 
communications. Although technology exists in many jurisdictions to allow for 
interoperability, “regionalized strategic plans are largely not in place.”13 
Enhancing regional collaboration will aid in ensuring that plans are aligned 
despite the diversified administration of homeland security activities.  Regional, 
multidiscipline planning is difficult because of the amount of collaboration and 
cooperation required. While equipment can be purchased and the actual act of receiving 
                                                 
10 State Homeland Security Program and Capability Review Guidebook,  64. 
11 Department of Homeland Security, National Plan Review, Phase 2 Report (Washington D.C: 
Department of Homeland Security, June 16, 2006), viii. 
12 Ibid., xii. 
13 Department of Homeland Security, Tactical Interoperable Communications Scorecards Summary 
Report and Findings (Washington D.C: Department of Homeland Security, January 2007), iii. 
5 
the equipment serves as a deliverable within a grant, coordination, cooperation, and 
collaboration do not. However, creating multi-jurisdictional plans to utilize that 
equipment is more difficult. Various disciplines including fire, law enforcement, 
emergency medical services, public and private health, etc., must work to together to plan 
with respect to homeland security. Despite mandates and guidance to collaborate, silos 
still exists with respect to response and planning.  
C. STATE PRIORITY 
Expanding regional collaboration has been mandated in South Carolina. In 
support of South Carolina Executive Order Number 2003-02, the State Law Enforcement 
Division (SLED) was established as the lead in crisis management for terrorist events.14 
In support of the executive order, SLED established four regional CTCCs.15 These 
councils were established to “maximize local involvement and streamline readiness and 
communication procedures.” The councils were also created to develop a network for 
distributing federal funds to “fulfill our statewide mission.”16 
Building regional capabilities has been a strategic goal for South Carolina since 
the attacks of 9/11. While South Carolina has many regional initiatives, the largest is 
specialized weapons of mass destruction teams. The formation of “regional” Chemical 
Ordnance Biological Radiological (COBRA) teams began shortly after 2001 and has 
been a priority for South Carolina since their inception. They have been supported by 
State HSGP funds under the aim of furthering goal 2.2.9 – “Enhance South Carolina’s 
capabilities to provide regional support and assistance to the jurisdictions for responding 
to a WMD event.”17  There are four advanced COBRA teams, one in each CTCC region 
of the state. According to the COBRA Standard Operating Procedure, “The Advanced 
Teams are the focal point for regionalized coordination, planning and training of all the 
teams within their respective regions.”18 However, regional planning and coordination 
                                                 
14 Mark Sanford, South Carolina Executive Order Number 2003-02. 
15 Robert M. Stewart, letter to CTCC members, dated March 28, 2003.  
16 Robert M. Stewart, memo to CTCC members dated June 19, 2003.  
17 2003 State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy, Executive Summary (Columbia, South 
Carolina: State Law Enforcement Division, 2003), 19. 
18 COBRA Response Team, Plan and Standard Operating Guidance, Version 1.0 (Columbia, South 
Carolina: South Carolina Emergency Management Division), 11.  
6 
has not taken place. There are no regional plans to specify how these teams can be 
utilized and what their capabilities are. Largely because of this, these teams were not 
utilized in the Graniteville train derailment in 2005. The state utilized the DHS Pre-
Positioned Equipment Pods that provided truckloads of personal protective equipment 
and only elements of three COBRA teams were utilized.19 In actuality, COBRA teams 
are county teams made up of in-county personnel and equipment. They perform no 
regional coordination function, planning, and limited training. One of the main 
impediments to regional planning, according to the Emergency Management Director 
responsible for one of these teams, is that there is no regional governance structure within 
the state. While South Carolina has many regional structures already in place, including 
Regional CTCCs, the state must still expand them to prepare for, respond to, recover 
from, and mitigate CBRNE events.  
Due to the emphasized role of regional collaboration, and perhaps more 
importantly to its impact on grant funding, “regional capability” has become a commonly 
used phrase within DHS and therefore at the state level. In addition to COBRA teams, 
regional councils have been formed to meet requirements of grants and efforts have been 
undertaken to create regional response capabilities. Within South Carolina’s Homeland 
Security Strategy, Strategic Goal 2.2 is to “Improve State, Regional, and local capabilities 
to respond to terrorist attacks employing chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or 
explosive devices, infectious disease outbreaks, public health threats, and other 
emergencies.”20 Regional capabilities including regional COBRA teams, specialty 
decontamination equipment, mass fatality trailers, mobile hospital systems, Urban Search 
and Rescue teams have been established and sustained within the state. The State 
Exercise Program now conducts exercises regionally so that various counties participate 
in the planning of and conduct of the exercises. 
D. BENEFITS OF REGIONAL COLLABORATION  
“Expanded regional collaboration supports the development of a seamless, 
national network of mutually-supporting capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond 
                                                 
19 South Carolina State Emergency Operation Center, Situation Report #10 (Columbia, South 
Carolina: South Carolina Emergency Management Division). 
20 COBRA Response Team, Plan and Standard Operating Guidance, Version 1.0, 16. 
7 
to, and recover from the full spectrum of threats and hazards.”21 High-risk communities 
obviously need more assets to be able to respond to possible Chemical Biological 
Radiological Nuclear Explosive/Weapons of Mass Destruction (CBRNE/WMD) events 
or natural hazards. To avoid duplications, regions must plan so that they are able to assess 
gaps by identifying shortfalls, and then identify ways to address those gaps via mutual 
aid. Below is a list of benefits of regional collaboration that the state of Kansas has 
outlined:22 
• Safer and better prepared system to protect from, respond to, recover from 
and mitigate the effects of a natural and/or man-made hazard; 
• Common baseline and sustainability plan across the region and state; 
• Grassroots view of priority needs; 
• Coordination of solution areas enhanced to ensure avoidance of 
duplication; 
• Shared approach for determining use of funds during a time of dwindling 
resources (most amount of good for the least amount of money); 
• Maximize resources through sharing;  
• Increase capabilities through regional assets (the whole is greater than the 
sum of the parts); 
• Gain strength through collective personnel and resources (strength in 
numbers and many minds are better than one); 
• Integrated approach for all hazards;  
• Confidence in response capability – builds trust throughout the region; 
• Stay ahead of national expectations – regional collaboration is becoming 
more and more a priority at the federal level. 
These are just an example of why collaboration is important; it allow for more 
effective utilization of homeland security funding, strengthening of mutual aid 
agreements, and ultimately a safer and better prepared nation.   
E.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Expanding regional collaboration has only recently been identified as a National 
Priority. For this reason, and though several regional structures exist in South Carolina 
and the nation, there is little supporting academic literature on how to enhance 
                                                 
21 National Preparedness Guidance, 19.  
22 State of Kansas, Regional Approach to Homeland Security.  
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collaboration within and among these regions. The source documents on which this thesis 
is built are: 1) The federal guidelines and mandates (Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 8 and the National Preparedness Guidance) which  provide the foundation for 
regionalization concepts and associated policies; 2) literature on why collaboration is 
difficult, which provide a baseline understanding  of why collaboration is difficult to 
obtain; 3) documents from other states, which provide clear examples of several models 
for expanded regional collaboration.  There is limited secondary literature on the impact 
and effectiveness of regionalization.  
The need for regional collaboration is obvious and has been repeated in much of 
the national guidance. Howitt mentions a variety of reasons for lack of collaboration such 
as costs, turf wars, and a lack of policy. He states that there is a “geographic mismatch 
between the scale of the problem and the scope of the government institutions that must 
deal with it. The impact of a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction could well 
extend over a broad metropolitan or interstate area, potentially involving dozens or 
hundreds of local governments and several states. The American government, however, 
lacks strong decision-making structures that connect diverse localities or that reach across 
state borders.”23 
There are regional planning organizations, such as the Council of Governments 
(COGs) that conduct regional planning across the nation. However, these entities are not 
governmental organizations so there is a cost associated with the planning. The National 
Association of Development Organizations, which provides advocacy for these 
organizations, states that according to a survey, “The most pressing homeland security 
need in small metropolitan and rural areas… is the need to provide incentives for regional 
cooperation among local jurisdictions.”24  
There are several criteria that DHS has recommended for the states to consider 
when creating collaborative regions: the locations of existing regions, proximity to large 
metropolitan areas, population, population density, critical infrastructure, and 
                                                 
23 Arnold M. Howitt, “Promoting Regional Collaboration,” Beyond the Beltway: Focusing on 
Homeland Security (Cambridge: Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, September 
2002), 28. 
24 National Association of Development Organizations, “Regional Approaches to Homeland Security 
Planning & Preparedness,” August, 2005. 
9 
capability.25 FEMA has also provided elements that should be examined in regional 
planning including multi-jurisdictional boundaries, overlapping areas of response, unique 
infrastructure, and mutual risk areas.26  
Enhanced regional collaboration is identified as a priority not just by the federal 
government, but also by numerous city and state-level organizations. The Emergency 
Services Discipline has stated that “no single community can be expected to develop and 
maintain the necessary capacity for a large-scale event.”27  The U.S. Conference of 
Mayors has confirmed that enhanced regional collaboration is needed to organize 
supplies during a disaster and for general emergency management issues. The National 
Association of Counties has requested funding to enhance regional planning and 
coordination. The National League of Cities has also called for cooperation in working 
regionally.28 
Throughout these documents, reasons are given for why regional collaboration is 
difficult and people do not naturally want to embrace it, but not for why collaboration is a 
bad idea. Regional planning has existed since at least 1909.29 It is an efficient and 
effective way to the share the costs of planning, response to, and recovery from a terrorist 
or natural-hazard event.  
F. PREVIOUS SOLUTIONS/METHODS  
Enhancing regional collaboration is an overarching National Priority and must be 
addressed by each state. According to the Implementation Plan for Regionalization 
developed by Iowa, regions have been established there to help streamline the grant 
process, and are therefore used primarily for funding rather than planning issues.30 In 
                                                 
25 National Preparedness Guidance, 21. 
26 Managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents: Interim Planning Guide for State 
and Local Governments (Washington D.C: Federal Emergency Management Agency, July 2002), 16.  
27 “Bioterrorism: Is Your Town Ready? Report Says Regionalization Is the Key” EMS Magazine 
(August 2004). 
28 William R. Dodge, Regional Emergency Preparedness Compacts: Safeguarding the Nation’s 
Communities (California: Alliance for Regional Stewardship, March 2002), 10. 
29 William N. Cassella, Jr., “Regional Planning and Governance: History and Politics,” in Regional 
Planning: Evolution Crisis and Prospects, ed. Gill C. Lim (New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun & Co. 
Publishers, Inc., 1983), 17. 
30 Implementation Plan for the Regionalization of Iowa Homeland Security, November 2004.  
10 
Kansas, by contrast, regionalization was established not only to aid with the grant process 
but also to facilitate regional planning and response capabilities.31  
Many states have already identified regions either for the streamlining of 
homeland security funding or as planning committees. Texas utilizes existing regional 
COGs as the basis for the Homeland Security regions in the state.32 The COGs are 
assigned the task of developing regional homeland security plans that are integrated into 
the statewide plan. Missouri has proposed that the existing State Highway Patrol Regions 
be utilized as the homeland security regions.33 The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) “strongly recommends” that states develop sub-state regions to address planning 
issues regarding prevention and response. Also, states are required to assess at least one 
multi-jurisdiction metropolitan area by analyzing alternative make-ups for that area, 
conducting an analysis of the varying areas identified, and selecting a preferred area.34 
Several regional structures are in place within the health discipline. The South 
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control has eight districts in which 
regional plans such as the Mass Casualty Plans are developed. Outside of South Carolina, 
planning regions exist in the National Capital Region, the Columbus Region, and the 
Kansas City Region.35 All of these regions include multi-jurisdictional areas where 
planning has taken place.  
South Carolina is mostly a rural state with four population centers throughout the 
state. Each homeland security region is centered around one of the population centers. A 
Regional CTCC represents each homeland security region, which in turn were initially 
created to support the HSGP.  
Many of the state agencies within South Carolina are “regionalized” for 
operational and planning purposes. The State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) and 
State EMD have four counterterrorism regions for planning. EMD also has different 
planning zones for the Fixed Nuclear Facilities. State EMD, along with SLED, has 
                                                 
31 State of Kansas, Regional Approach to Homeland Security.  
32 Rick Perry, Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan (State of Texas, January 30, 2004).  
33 Homeland Security Statewide Regionalization Framework (State of Missouri, July 2006). 
34 National Preparedness Guidance, 22. 
35 Dodge, Regional Emergency Preparedness Compacts.  
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established regional assets in four regions of the state. These regional assets, however, are 
actually county assets that have been designated to use regionally. For example, the four 
regional COBRA teams (advanced hazmat teams) are assigned to the four most populous 
counties in the state and are de facto county teams. They consist of county volunteers, 
they typically respond in-county, and unless requested for mutual aid by the state, do not 
respond to other counties. Other than the equipment being placed strategically in regions, 
there is no regional response. Regional plans do not exist and regional training and 
exercises are limited.   
G. EXPANDING REGIONAL COLLABORATION  
“Regional approaches have been recognized as a key way to address the threat of 
terrorism.”36 This thesis will examine why regional collaboration is difficult and not 
readily accomplished and recommend solutions on how to expand regional collaboration 
utilizing Iowa, Michigan, and Arizona as case studies. These states will be examined to 
see what steps they have taken to expand regional collaboration. Consistent patterns will 
be analyzed to determine what has aided in expanding regional collaboration. The 
effectiveness of regional collaboration efforts are measured by the degree to which 
states have developed regional planning structures, regional strategies, and funding 
allocations based on regions.   Existing literature will be examined to determine the 
basis of regional collaboration barriers and theories to overcome them. By analyzing 
existing literature, examining other state and/or regional structures, and building upon 
personal experience, a set of recommendations or guidelines will be produced to expand 
South Carolina’s ability to collaborate regionally.  
There are a variety of ways to enhance regional collaboration, including 
enhancing plans, tying federal funding directly to regional structures, and creating 
regional strategic plans.  The central piece of this thesis will identify how other states 
have overcome impediments to regional collaboration, and what specific steps they have 
taken to expand regional collaboration. Various regional structures and plans will be 
reviewed, and a series of guidelines will be created from these plans by which to enhance 
collaboration.  
                                                 
36 Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness 
(Washington D.C: United States Government Accountability Office, September 2004), 1. 
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The research associated with this thesis will provide guidance for the regions and 
the state as a whole to meet the national mandates of enhancing regional collaboration, 
and to develop a set of best practices and therefore guidelines on how to collaborate in 
order to begin the planning process of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a 
disaster. 
Regional collaboration is a national priority but has been an obstacle for many 
states due to lack of guidance. This project, while not conclusive, will offer guidance on 
how to expand regional collaboration.  Chapter II will discuss the definition of regional 
collaboration, metrics associated with the achievement of regional collaboration, and 
impediments to achieving regional collaboration. Chapter III  will examine efforts within 
South Carolina that have been implemented to expand regional collaboration and specific 
difficulties within the state that hinder regional collaboration. Chapter  IV is a case study 
of three states’ efforts to expand regional collaboration. Chapter V  will provide specific, 
actionable recommendation on how regional collaboration can be enhanced in South 
Carolina (and elsewhere). Chapter VI will serve as a brief discussion and conclusion to 
this thesis.  
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II. ACHIEVING REGIONAL COLLABORATION 
A Region, someone has wryly observed, is an area safely larger than the 
last one to whose problems we found no solution.37 
In order to establish metrics for achieving regional collaboration, the definition of 
regional collaboration must first be understood. Although the above quote by Jane Jacobs 
is not the definition of regions one would hope to find, it does reflect the ambiguous 
nature of a region. This chapter attempts to define, describe, and measure regional 
collaboration, discusses the variety of current regional concepts and how regions are 
structured within states. Section C, Effects of Regional Collaboration, discusses some of 
the specific benefits of regional collaboration. Measuring Regional Collaboration, 
Section D, examines efforts to measure, or apply metrics to, regional collaboration.  
Section E, Key Elements of Regional Collaboration, looks at the three key elements of 
regional collaboration: Leadership, Mission, and Stakeholder Involvement. Section F, 
Impediments to Regional Collaboration, expands on the difficulties and barriers to 
regional collaboration including several theories as to why regional collaboration is 
especially difficult in the United States. The purpose of this chapter is to gain a better 
understanding of regional collaboration, and despite its value and importance, why it is 
not readily achieved or implemented.   
A. DEFINITION OF REGIONAL COLLABORATION 
What defines a region? The Taskforce for Regional Disaster Resilience defines a 
region as “any area that is defined as such by stakeholders responsible for disaster 
preparedness and management.”38 The Task Force goes on to note that regions “generally 
have certain accepted cultural characteristics and geographic boundaries and tend to 
coincide with the service areas of the infrastructures that serve them.”39 Regions have 
been defined based on geography, mutual aid agreements, pre-existing regional structures  
 
                                                 
37 Robert Fishman, “The Death and Life of American Regional Planning,” in Reflections on 
Regionalism, ed. Bruce Katz (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institute Press, 2000), 107.  
38 The Infrastructure for Security Partnership, Task Force for Regional Disaster Preparedness, “Special 
Report: Guide For An Action Plan to Develop Regional Disaster Resilience,” Feburary 16, 2006, 8. 
39 “Special Report: Guide For An Action Plan,” 8. 
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such as that of Highway Patrol regions in a state or council of government (COG) 
regions. The National Preparedness Guidance offers some sensible guidance to definig 
regions within a state: 
1. Analyze alternative geographic and jurisdictional compositions options 
such as: 
a. Any currently designated multi-jurisdictional area (e.g., UASI 
Urban Area, State Emergency Management district, State 
homeland security region, or Local Emergency Planning 
Committee); 
b. The jurisdictions and entities included within a standard planning 
radius from the center of the core city (e.g., all counties within a 
100 mile radius from the center of the core city); and  
c. The entities within the Metropolitan Statistical Area (as defined by 
the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget). 
2. Conduct an analysis of alternatives around the identified options in Step 1 
above. Planning considerations include: 
a. Compare each of the options identified above to the collective set 
of potential effects of major events (i.e., the potential set of major 
events as represented by the National Planning Scenarios); 
i. For each option, using the set of potential effects as the 
basis, assess factors such as total population, population 
density, and presence of critical infrastructure; and 
ii. For each option, consider the resident capability present in 
each of the jurisdictions and tradeoffs among the options 
versus the collective capability needed to prevent and 
respond to these events. 
3. Select a preferred regional geographic and jurisdictional option. 
 
Once a preferred option is selected, efforts should begin to adjust and update 
plans, strengthen mutual aid, and begin regional training and exercises according to the 
region. Initially, evaluating and strengthening existing planning and regional 
collaboration structures provides the foundation for a system of sub-State regions that 
cover the entire State. In the future, such regions will be required and will subsequently 




1, 2005). To the extent possible, all States should begin in FY 2005 to assess options and 
consider various regional configurations that develop or modify sub-State regions to 
center on major population areas.”40 
Though it is not presently enforced, the National Preparedness Guidance does 
require that all states take an approach similar to the one above to “analyze alternative 
options for the geographic and jurisdictional composition of their sub-State regions.”41 
This process was also required to identify a multi-jurisdictional, metropolitan area in the 
state, later used to develop the Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan.  
Webster’s dictionary defines collaboration as “to work jointly with others or 
together…”42 Webster also defines collaboration as cooperating. The United States 
Government Accountability Office has defined collaboration as “any joint activity by two 
or more organizations intended to produce more public value than could be produced 
when the organizations act alone.”43 Collaboration can also mean coordination. The 
United States Government Accountability Office has defined regional coordination as the 
“use of governmental resources in a complementary way towards goals and objectives 
that are mutually agreed upon by various stakeholders in a region.”44   
Regional collaboration is not defined by the Interim National Preparedness Goal; 
however, the Goal does state that regional collaboration is achieved “through mutual aid 
agreements and assistance compacts in order to meet the target levels of capability in the 
most effective and expedient manner.”45 This statement is quite ambiguous. While this 
statement may work for general, national guidance purposes, it leaves states and locals 
questioning how to achieve such. Mutual aid agreements are only one effect of regional 
collaboration. 
                                                 
40 National Preparedness Guidance, 22. 
41 Ibid., 22. 
42 Merriam-Webster Online. http://webster.com/dictionary/collaboration. Accessed November 27, 
2006. 
43 William O. Jenkins Jr., “Homeland Security, Assessment of the National Capital Region Strategic 
Plan,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
U.S. Senate (Washington D.C: United States Government Accountability Office), 4. 
44 Ibid. 
45 National Preparedness Goal, 11. 
16 
There has been much debate concerning the definition of a region. Should a 
region be based purely on geography or capability? There is no clear way to decide, and 
states have therefore taken very different approaches to defining regions, as we will see 
in the next chapter. Often, states simply adopted an existing state agency regional 
structure without analyzing existing mutual aid agreements between the counties or 
examining other relationships between these counties such as regional mass casualty 
plans. While a “cookie-cutter” approach is not appropriate for defining regions within 
states across the nation, lessons may be gleaned from efforts taken by several states to 
enhance regional collaboration.  
The formulas used to enhance regional collaboration depend on a number of  
variables of the member jurisdictions such as their number, type, and composition (the 
definition of the region).46 The process of identifying and defining the region will 
“require candidates to assess their primary methods or approaches for enhancing 
preparedness” and the subsequent structure of the region will have an impact decision-
making. If regions have been defined using varying criteria, preparedness efforts will not 
be consistent and gaps will exist. Regional structure can also affect decision-making,  
making it difficult to be consistent in planning, response, and recovery from a major 
disaster. Although all decision-making should be made according the National Incident 
Management System, regional structures can have an impact. Therefore, it is vital that for 
emergency preparedness, regions be defined on an agreed set of criteria.  
B. STRUCTURE OF THE REGION – CAPABILITY OR GEOGRAPHY 
Regions are defined in the National Preparedness Goal as a “geographic area 
consisting of contiguous State, local, and tribal entities located in whole or in part within 
a designated planning radius of a core high threat urban area.”47 But the identification of 
a high threat urban area is not an easy task, especially in a rural state. Population, 
population density, and critical infrastructure weigh heavily when looking at high threat 
areas. HSGP funding is based on the terrorist threat to an area. There is debate, however, 
                                                 
46 The Emergency Management Accreditation Program, “A Framework for Assessing Regional 
Preparedness: A White Paper on Applying Emergency Preparedness Standards to Multijurisdictional 
Areas” (April 2006). 
47 Interim National Preparedness Goal (Washington D.C: Department of Homeland Security, March 
31, 2005), 11. 
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as to whether the threat of natural hazards and their risks should also be tied to the 
allocation of homeland security funding. Until recently, the risk picture that determined 
HSGP funding looked only at terrorism risk. However, the Fiscal Year 2007 HSGP 
guidance states that natural hazards can be mitigated with the funding as well.48 This is a 
new line of thought within this grant program. While “dual-benefit” has always been 
implied with terrorism as the key focus, the Fiscal Year 2007 grant program guidance 
clearly states that funds can be used for natural hazards as long as there is a dual-benefit 
for terrorism. An additional component of this debate focuses on the proper weight of 
capabilities rather than geography in the determination of regional boundaries. This 
would produce a region that is not necessarily centered on a high threat area, but rather 
one that follows the flow of key capabilities. 
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) cities are regional efforts funded by DHS. 
But the definition of UASI cities, or regions, is somewhat ambiguous. For example, as 
described in the HSGP Guidance, any city with a population of 100,000 or above is 
eligible. A ten-mile radius circle is then drawn around the boundary of the city to 
determine the urban area region. Other areas outside of this area can be added, but none 
of the areas within that ten-mile area can be deleted or excluded from the urban area. 
There is no documentation to explain the reasoning behind the ten-mile area region. Also, 
only a terrorism threat is used to qualify the city. With the all-hazards scope, all hazards 
will need to be examined to be consistent with the HSGP, which may expand the 
boundary of the region. Based on recent history, terrorism has only been focused in high 
population areas; however, natural hazards can strike anywhere. 
C.  EFFECTS OF REGIONAL COLLABORATION 
The outcomes or effects of regional collaboration have been documented in 
several sources. The United States Government Accountability Office notes that 
“effective regional collaboration is characterized by, among other things, the presence of 
a regional organization of many diverse stakeholders that identifies a problems and 
possible solutions…The combined outcome of the collaboration interaction of those 
parties is a strategic plan that is made actionable by the presence of goals and 
                                                 
48 FY2007 Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidance and Application Kit. 
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objectives.”49 According to DHS, metrics, or benchmarks, for achieving regional 
collaboration include “(1) formalizing mutual aid agreement with surrounding 
communities and states to share equipment, personnel, and facilities during emergencies; 
(2) conducting exercises of the execution of mutual aid agreements to identify the 
challenges and familiarize officials with resources that are available in the region; and (3) 
coordinating homeland security preparedness assistance expenditures and planning 
efforts on a regional basis to avoid duplicative or inconsistent investments.”50 Pre-
planning at a regional level can also reduce stress during an actual event by the 
knowledge of available assets in a defined region, the knowledge and trust of those who 
will be responding to provide aid and assistance, and a defined set of roles and 
responsibilities according to National Incident Management System (NIMS) standards. 
D. MEASURING REGIONAL COLLABORATION 
DHS does not provide sufficient metrics for regional collaboration. A single 
statewide agreement, by terms of the National Preparedness Goal, would constitute 
regional collaboration. South Carolina indeed has a statewide mutual aid agreement in 
place, but its signing in no way constitutes the acceptance or realization of regional 
collaboration. While mutual aid agreements are a part of regional collaboration, they are 
not the proper end state. While South Carolina is a small state, regional planning remains 
a problem. Neighboring jurisdictions are not aware of each other’s capabilities, plans, or 
resources. Although regions have been established, little collaboration has taken place.  
Regional collaboration can be measured by its effect as presented in the above 
section. Although expanding regional collaboration is a national priority, it is not a target 
capability and therefore lacks metrics. How does a region or state know it has achieved 
regional collaboration? It is not simply the creation of regional councils, or the funding or 
regional response teams. One way to determine the level of regional collaboration is the 
creation of regional plans that address all phases of preparedness including prevention, 
response, recovery and mitigation. These plans are not intended to usurp the counties’ or 
state’s own plan, but are intended to provide a maximum benefit for all agencies. The 
culmination of regional councils, mission, etc. is the creation of a regional plan that 
                                                 
49 Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, 23.  
50 Ibid. 
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outlines, in accordance with existing plans, roles and responsibilities as well as assets 
available for mutual aid. Plans must be in place to ensure that these councils and teams 
are functional.   
Howitt and Pangi note that “Effective collaboration across jurisdictional 
boundaries is essential to encourage compatibility in equipment and operation planning, 
minimize redundant investments in specialized equipment, reduce geographic gaps in 
preparedness by smaller communities, spur joint training and exercises, and broker 
stronger mutual assistance agreements.”51 Also, “regionalization… implements a process 
in which response disciplines and jurisdictions are forced to accurately assess capability 
levels in order to plan integrated response protocols.”52 The actions of these benefits can 
also be used to measure regional collaboration. 
One measure of achieving regional collaboration is the creation of a strategic plan 
for the region. A strategic plan provides a region with a clear mission and vision 
statement, and an outline to work toward specific goals and objectives. The United States 
Government Accountability Office has outlined six desirable characteristics of a regional 
strategy: 
•  “Purpose, scope, and methodology that address why the strategy was 
produced, the scope of its coverage, and the process by which it was 
developed.  
• Problem definition and risk assessment that address the particular regional 
problems and threats the strategy is directed towards.  
• Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures that 
address what the strategy is trying to achieve, steps to achieve those 
results, as well as the priorities, milestones, and performance measures to 
gauge results.  
• Resources, investments, and risk management that address what the 
strategy will cost, the sources and types of resources and investments 
needed, and where resources and investments should be targeted by 
balancing risk reductions and costs.  
                                                 
51 Arnold M. Howitt and Robyn L. Pangi, “Intergovernmental Challenges of Combating Terrorism,” 
in Countering Terrorism; Dimensions of Preparedness, ed. Arnold M. Howitt and Robyn L. Pangi 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003), 52. 
52 Susan K. Reinertson, “Resource Sharing, Building Collaboration for Regionalization” (M.A. thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, September 2005), 13.  
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• Integration and implementation that address how a regional strategy 
relates to other strategies’ goals, objectives and activities, and to state and 
local governments within their region and their plans to implement the 
strategy.  
• Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination that address who 
will be implementing the strategy, what their roles will be compared to 
those of others, and mechanisms for them to coordinate their efforts.”53 
E. KEY ELEMENTS FOR REGIONAL COLLABORATION 
1.  Leadership 
In order for collaboration to be successful, the right people must be involved.; 
those who have the power to create change and foster relationships (key leaders) must be 
committed to and intimately involved with the process of enhancing collaboration. 
“Leadership dedicated to stakeholder involvement is a critical characteristic of high-
performing partnerships, second only to achieving results.”54 Organizational leaders often 
designate people to attend meetings in their place. This practice is counter-productive for 
several reasons: the designees do not feel comfortable or capable of representing and 
speaking for the needs or views of their department or organization, and this in turn  
causes frustration in the group and hinders collaboration.  
2.  Mission Statement  
In order for regional collaboration to take place, there must be a clear mission or 
vision statement of the desired end goal or result. Once the National Preparedness Goal is 
finalized, tiers will be assigned to regions that will aid in the creation of defining a 
mission. But in the absence of such focus presently, regional groups tend not to be 
productive.  
3.  Stakeholder Involvement 
In order for the regional concept to work, each county must have a sense of 
ownership in the region and something to offer. Each county must feel that it belongs to a 
region with similar interests, and that their specific needs are being recognized and 
addressed: “Allowing all stakeholders to jointly name and frame…issues for regional 
collaboration is important for one simple reason – to foster ownership and commitment. 
Since no single institution or entity is responsible or has the authority to address a multi-
                                                 
53 Jenkins, “Homeland Security,” 5. 
54 Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, 23. 
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jurisdictional problem, the issues and potential solutions must reflect the interests and 
viewpoints of people that have a stake in the issue, those who are needed to implement 
any potential outcome, and those that might feel compelled to challenge the process or its 
outcome.”55  Only by creating a sense of ownership for each county will the homeland 
security regions in South Carolina be able to enhance regional collaboration and therefore 
make South Carolina more prepared to respond to a terrorist and/or natural disaster.  
F. IMPEDIMENTS TO REGIONAL COLLABORATION 
1. Collective Action 
The actual make-up of the regional structure is important to enhancing regional 
collaboration. If the region is too large, collaboration cannot take place due to its  
heterogeneity. According to Victoria Basolo, a variety of the problems with regionalism 
are “associated with higher number of jurisdictions within a region.”56 Basolo bases most 
of her article on Mancur Olson who was interested in group dynamics, specifically how 
the size of the group affects group productivity. Olson argues that the rationale for  
forming a group is for collective action to foster a product of common good. However, 
the propensity of individuals in the group is to want a higher benefit for a lesser cost. 
Olsen argues that “as a group gets larger, any one person’s share of the collective good is 
lessened, which reduces an individual’s motivation to bear any of the cost.”57 He also 
points out that a larger group does not produce a collective good unless it is coerced or 
has some outside incentive for group members to act in the common interest. In this 
context, Basolo asserts, the state and federal government have the authority and power to 
provide outside incentives for a larger regional group.  
2. Local Autonomy 
Basolo mentions several theories to hypothesize why regionalism is not fully 
endorsed by all jurisdictions. The Local Autonomy theory is self-explanatory: it is a  
“cultural explanation concerning the desire for local autonomy in governance.”58 Local 
autonomy is embedded in American culture and can be traced back to the fight for 
                                                 
55 University of Montana, Public Policy Research Institute, “Planning Across Boundaries: Habits of 
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political freedom and the lack of trust in big government. “In many ways, the American 
system of federalism reflects the political values cherished and nurtured by the people. 
The founding fathers distrusted the centralized political system of European countries and 
carefully guarded against the concentration of power in one hand. During the early years 
of the post-Independence period, deTocqueville observed that the advantages enjoyed by 
American local institutions were among the foremost reasons cited by its citizens for the 
country’s power and prosperity.”59 The concern about fragmentation and the concept of 
regional governance can be dated back to the National Municipal League’s annual 
conference in 1909, which proposed a form of governance that would preserve local 
governments’ rights, but still have a regional representative council.60   
3. Public Choice 
Public Choice theory is more of a competition-based theory in that “rational self-
interest promotes competition among localities and reduces the likelihood of regional 
cooperation.”61 Independent, smaller units of government appear to be the more 
favorable form of government in the United States. In 1993, there were more than 33,000 
special-purpose districts in the United States, making them the most common form of 
local government. Of these 33,000 special purpose districts, 90% perform a single 
function such as sewer or water services.62 The creation of numerous special-purpose 
districts, towns and cities within counties, and the law of home rule support the local 
autonomy theory. Citizens and leaders do not want to cede any of their terriroty’s power 
and are therefore disinclined toward regionalism.  
The three theories Basolo examines (Collective Action, Local Autonomy, and 
Public Choice) all “suggest that the number of jurisdictions in a region impacts 
outcomes.”63 If a  region is too small, on the other hand, collaboration is equally 
ineffective. The literature exposes the discrepancy here; for example, the GAO reports 
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that “regional organizations that include representation from many different jurisdictions 
and diverse stakeholders serve as structured forums for these parties to discuss public 
policy problems and agree on possible solutions.”64 In areas where regional planning for 
preparedness is a new theory, it is vital to start with a small group or ensure that there is 
“some outside inducements that will lead the members of the large group to act in their 
common interest.”65 The planning process can quickly become difficult if there are too 
many people in a room without a clear picture of the end result. Therefore, the actual 
structure of the region is vital to expanding regional collaboration. A right mix of 
capability, cohesiveness, and familiarity is needed to expand regional collaboration. A 
region must be large enough to offer the benefits of regional collaboration, such as 
sharing the cost of the risk and therefore the costs to mitigate the risk, but yet still small 
and homogeneous enough to actually develop and implement common solutions.  
Which level of government determines the regional structure depends on the strength of 
leadership at the local level. In regions where leadership is strong and encourages 
collaborative effort, regions formed locally will have a more coherent structure and 
function more collaboratively. “By allowing jurisdictions to identify the boundaries of the 
region, they can take advantage of regional leadership or political relationships that can 
bring additional stakeholders, resources, or ideas to the process.”66 However, if 
leadership is not strong, it is up to the state to promote regional collaboration attempting 
to keep geographic, existing mutual aid agreements, cultural, and regional leaders 
concerns in mind while determining the structure.  
4. Concept of Regions 
The concept of regional planning has been around for years in the transportation 
and health arena, but is difficult to implement for preparedness planning. “Regional 
cooperation was already key to living the good life before September 11. Public, private, 
and civic sector leaders, along with citizens, had already accepted the need to come 
together across regions to compete successfully in the global economy, protect air and 
water quality, and provide roads, transit, airports, parks, and other quality-of-life 
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amenities. They had even begun to come together to shape sensible regional growth to 
avoid squandering increasingly scarce resources on profligate sprawl. On September 11, 
the toughest regional challenge shifted from improving the quality of life to saving lives. 
Overnight, everyone realized that shaping balanced growth has to begin with 
safeguarding the citizens, businesses, and institutions and ‘hardening’ the infrastructure 
that makes our regions competitive in the global economy.”67   
5. Ownership 
While is has been widely observed that every event is local, terrorism or any 
catastrophic event is actually regional in scope. Because a catastrophic event will quickly 
deplete if not incapacitate local first responders and resources, it is vital that regional 
planning take place to help mitigate the effects of a catastrophic event. However, building 
regional relationships is often difficult. “Coalition building is critical to regionalism 
because of the nature of a region. In most cases, the region is nobody’s community. This 
means that getting any action at the regional scale requires creating new collaborative 
alignments among interests who previously either didn’t believe that they shared issues in 
common, or who knew it but felt no compelling reason to act on it. In the end, the story 
of effective…regionalism is always going to be the search for cross-cutting issues, an 
never-ending saga that is the meat and potatoes of those efforts.”68  
6. Cultural Change 
The homeland security community (fire, law enforcement, emergency medical 
services, etc.) are all primarily response rather than preventative agencies. Pre-9/11 this 
also applied to the lead for terrorism response, the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
Ashton Carter notes that strictly responding to an event has been so deeply entrenched in 
its culture that “the attorney general has to prod the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
publicly to shift its efforts from ‘solving the case’ to preventing another disaster.”69 9/11 
changed first responders into first preventers. Preventing terror attacks cannot be done in 
isolation, but must be a collaborative process. “Achieving greater integration requires 
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meeting significant organizational challenges.”70 The key agencies mentioned above do 
not work together on a routine basis. There are still disciplinary obstructions that hinder 
the process of collaboration and cooperation. Perhaps the most common example is the 
inability of the New York Police Department and the Fire Department New York to work 
in a collaborative and cooperative environment. There are also conflicts between fire and 
emergency medical services as to who can provide treatment to patients; many fire 
fighters are becoming paramedics and the emergency medical community feels infringed 
upon.. Yet another example is that of emergency management and homeland security, 
where there are two different agencies in the state with these functions. While many of 
these disciplines can work past their problems during the response to an incident because 
life safety always comes first, planning for homeland security is much more challenging. 
It is very difficult to get all agencies or disciplines to attend a meeting and then discuss 
gaps and capability building and/or sharing. No agency wants to admit a weakness and all 
are territorial. This hinders collaboration. Yet another hindrance to regional collaboration 
is the lack of similar structure across all disciplines. For example, law enforcement has 
representation at the local, county, state, and federal level, while agencies such as fire and 
EMS generally only have representation at the local level.  
7.  General Structure 
Despite the lack of interconnectedness between first responders, they are not 
solely to blame for the lack of regional collaboration; the very structure of the American 
government does not lend itself to regional collaboration. “The fragmentation of 
subnational government also makes it difficult to organize prevention and emergency 
response functions across jurisdictional boundaries in a given metropolitan area or 
state.”71 
“Improving preparedness for terrorism is an expensive, time-consuming, and 
exacting task.”72 The major push for terrorism preparedness came after 9/11. Because  
many local agencies do not have the budgets for normal, day-to-day operations, it was 
and continues to be an expensive task to equip, train, and ultimately prepare first 
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responders for a terrorist event. Because many within the homeland security community 
have not worked closely together before, preparedness planning is very time consuming. 
It takes years to build the trust of other disciplines in the community and even longer to 
build a sense of trust and competency throughout the region.  
Achieving regional collaboration is not an easy task. Relationships and trust must 
be built and sustained, leadership must step outside of their comfort zones to discuss 
homeland security planning, and regional collaborative groups must have clear missions 
to direct them. The benefits of regional collaboration are worth the front-end work to 
build relationships, garner trust, and create mission statements. The next chapter will 
identify regional efforts in South Carolina and how the lack of integrated regional 
planning has created further impediments to regional collaboration.  
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III. SOUTH CAROLINA REGIONAL STRUCTURE 
South Carolina is mostly a rural state. The largest city in the state is the capital 
city, Columbia, with a population of just over 115,000. The total population of the state is 
4,012,012. The largest county in the state is Greenville County with a population of 
379,616. Tourism and agriculture are the state’s largest sources of revenue.73 South 
Carolina, like many other states in the Union, is a home rule state with forty two  
counties, 269 cities, and over 500 special purpose districts;74 the sheer number of 
municipalities within the state makes it difficult to expand regional collaboration. 
Another impediment is the inconsistent structure of the regions. This chapter will look at 
those structures in some detail: Section A, Counter-Terrorism Coordinating Council; 
Section B, Emergency Management Division; Section C, Department of Health and 
Environmental Control; Section D, Highway Patrol and Communications; Section E, 
Councils of Government; Section F, Firefighter Mobilization; Section G, Animal 
Response Teams; and Section H, Regional Planners. Each of the agencies, organizations 
and teams represented by the regions discussed herein is a key partner in homeland 
security. The final section of this chapter, Section I, Discussion, provides an overview of 
how regional collaboration has been implemented throughout the state and the effects of 
such efforts. 
A. COUNTER-TERRORISM COORDINATING COUNCIL 
There has been a lack of regional planning for coordinating resources within the 
CTCC regions. This is due in part to the lack of a mission at the regional level. The 
Homeland Security Advisor (HSA) for South Carolina, the Chief of SLED, has not 
provided specific missions for the Regional CTCCs; therefore, they lack motivation and 
direction. The HSA would like the regions to take ownership of the Regional CTCCs and 
develop their own mission statement. This has yet to be done and the councils are 
beginning to falter. Representatives are being sent to attend the meetings in place of 
                                                 
73 South Carolina’s Economy. http://www.scprt.com/facts-figures/geographyclimateeconomy.aspx.  
Accessed December 18, 2006.  
74 Home Rule Status by State. 
http://www.celdf.org/HomeRule/DoesmyStatehaveHomeRule/tabid/115/Default.aspx. Accessed December 
18, 2006. 
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council members, the meetings are held only when there is new information related to 
homeland security funding, and there is a sense of frustration in the meetings because of 
lack of focus.  The regional committees involve people in key leadership roles such as 
sheriffs and emergency management directors. Figure 1 is a representation of the 
membership of the regional committees.  The State CTCC mission statement below has 
therefore been the only guidance available to the regions; however, it is doubtful that 
regions are aware of the State CTCC mission. The mission of the State CTCC is to: 
Support and advise the State Law Enforcement Division concerning its 
counter terrorism mission in an effort to facilitate and foster cooperation 
and coordination among various governmental and private entities and 
disciplines both statewide and regionally. This shall be accomplished 
through: 
• planning,  
• training/exercises, 
• determining required resources including equipment and 
location,  
• grant funding recommendations, 
• information sharing, 
• mutual aid agreements,  
• establishing best practices, and 
• any other activities consistent with furthering the counter 
terrorism     effort.75 
 
There are several reasons the current Regional CTCCs are not collaborating 
including regional structure, lack of guidance, and lack of responsibility. The current 
regional structure encompasses counties of varying size (both population and area). The 
regions are generally centered around one major metropolitan area or county. These large 
counties house the Advanced COBRA team for each region. With one large county and 
the remainder of the counties more rural, the regions do not have a uniform distribution 
therefore making collaboration difficult. The only thing that connects most of the 
counties is geography. For example, within the Low Country region, Charleston County 
has the Port of Charleston, which is an important piece of critical infrastructure within the 
Low Country. But, the Low Country region also contains Calhoun County, which is 
otherwise largely rural county with little to no critical infrastructure. Therefore, in the 
                                                 
75 South Carolina Law Enforcement Division. 
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Low Country CTCC meetings, it is difficult for Calhoun County to make a case for a 
need to resources when a larger county such as Charleston is in the same room.  Often, 
the smaller counties such as Calhoun feel left out, and all the counties feel as though 
Charleston County is the 800-pound gorilla standing in the corner.  
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The CTCC regions are represented in Figure 2. These regions are aligned to the 
SLED regions throughout the state and serve as the planning regions for SLED’s CTCC 
Planners. Within the four CTCC regions are the Advanced COBRA teams and a mix of 
Basic COBRA teams, as depicted in Figure 3. York County is in the process of becoming 
an advanced team. The Advanced COBRA teams are located in Greenville, Richland, 
Charleston, and Horry, the most populous counties in each of the four regions. The Basic 
COBRA teams are located in all counties with a population over 100,000. The mission of 
the COBRA teams are to “rapidly respond to and assist jurisdictions in effectively 
addressing the consequences of a critical incident involving weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) in collaboration with and supported by other 
COBRA teams and local, state, and federal resources.”76 Also in Figure 4 are the regional 
Explosive Ordnance Device (EOD) teams. While the COBRA teams may or may not 
have a bomb capability, the HSGP has supported and enhanced these various teams 
throughout the state. Charleston County is shaded differently because it has two EOD 
teams.  
The CTCC regions are also being utilized for the newly formed regional teams 
(Disaster Medical Assistance Team and one Incident Support Team) supported by the 
HSGP for Fiscal Year 2006. These teams will not be located in the same counties as the 
Advanced COBRA teams. Also, a catastrophic planning initiative is being implemented 
in each of the Advanced COBRA team counties to develop a regional concept of 
operations plan.  
 
                                                 
76 COBRA Response Team, Plan & Standard Operating Guidelines, 1.  
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Figure 2.   Counter Terrorism Coordinating Council Regions 
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Figure 3.   COBRA Teams  
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Figure 4.   Regional Explosive Ordnance Device Teams 
 
B. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DIVISION  
The South Carolina EMD operates within two different regional structures. The 
Homeland Security Exercise Program, which is funded through the State Administrative 
Agency (SLED) by DHS, operates within the CTCC regional structure as depicted in 
Figure 2. However, EMD also has Fixed Nuclear Facility regions, as depicted in Figure 5. 
These regions also serve as the newly created Emergency Management Regions. EMD 
has two personnel assigned to each Emergency Management Region to assist emergency 
management with plan enhancement, exercises, and the development of a comprehensive 
emergency management program.77 
                                                 
77 Adjutant General’s Office, Emergency Management Division, “Posting Notice for Emergency 
Preparedness Coord 1”, Position # P000143108, posted 9/15/2006. 
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Figure 5.   South Carolina Emergency Management Division Regions 
 
C. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL  
DHEC’s mission is to “promote and protect the health of the public and the 
environment.”78 DHEC plays several key roles in preparedness such as coordinating the 
Mass Casualty Plans based on the regions in Figure 6. Also, DHEC, through its Bureau of 
Land and Waste Management, Division of Waste Assessment and Emergency Response 
is part of the State Weapons of Mass Destruction Team. There are twelve regional DHEC 
Environmental Quality Control (EQC) District office Emergency Response Teams 
(DHEC use to have twelve EQC regions and eight health regions).  DHEC also handles 
the Centers for Disease Control Public Health Emergency Preparedness program and the 
Heath Resources and Services Administration Bioterrorism Preparedness program.  
                                                 
78 Environmental Services, EQC Regional Offices. 
http://www.scdhec.gov/environment/envserv/regions.htm. Accessed December 18, 2006. 
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D. HIGHWAY PATROL AND COMMUNICATIONS 
The South Carolina Highway Patrol and Palmetto 800 Regional Mutual Aid 
Communications Channel regions are identical and are depicted in Figure 7. Palmetto 
800 is the South Carolina Statewide 800 MHz Radio and Mobile Data System utilized 
throughout the state. Planning and programming of radios is done by regions. For 
example, all law enforcement officers within a region have at least one common channel 
called Law Enforcement Common. 
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Figure 7.   South Carolina Highway Patrol and Palmetto 800 Regional Mutual Aid 
Communications Channel Regions 
 
E. COUNCILS OF GOVERNMENT 
The State of South Carolina has ten Councils of Government (COG) as depicted 
in Figure 8. Each COG represents a multi-county planning district. EMD utilizes the 
COG regions for earthquake planning. Also, in 2002, the COGs were utilized to develop 
regional hazard mitigation plans in most areas of the state.79 COGs have also been used 
to conduct HazMat training throughout the various regions. 
                                                 
79 Hazard Mitigation Plan (Columbia, South Carolina: South Carolina Emergency Management 
Division, October 2004), 13. 
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Figure 8.   South Carolina Council of Government Regions 
 
F. FIREFIGHTER MOBILIZATION 
The South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (LLR), 
Office of the State Fire Marshall manages the South Carolina Firefighter Mobilization 
Plan. The “Firefighter Mobilization Act of 2000” established this program to mobilize 
and task the state’s fire service during a large-scale incident where the local fire 
departments are overwhelmed. Regional coordinators are assigned to the regions as 
depicted in Figure 9. These regions are identical to the Fire Academy’s regions. “During 
Firefighter Mobilization Plan activation, these coordinators can be called on to contact 
fire departments in their region about providing assistance and resources.”80 Although 
this is mostly an emergency management function, the emergency management regions 
do not align with the LLR regions. LLR has also, with the support of homeland security 
funding, placed four mass decontamination trailers and four Urban Search and Rescue 
teams throughout the state to serve in regional capacities.  
                                                 
80 South Carolina Fire Fighter Mobilization Brochure. 
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G. ANIMAL RESPONSE TEAMS 
Clemson University created county and regional animal response teams, known as 
County Animal Response Teams (CART). These teams are equipped with funding 
through the HSGP and are designed to respond to disasters involving animals and/or 
agricultural assets. As depicted in Figure 10, there are six regional CARTS throughout 
the state. County CARTs are also located sporadically throughout the state. The 
operational status of the regional or county CARTs is debatable. The teams were 
provided with equipment, but have not been staffed adequately and have not participated 
in any of the homeland security exercises held throughout the state.  
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Figure 10.   Regional County Animal Response Teams 
 
H. REGIONAL PLANNERS 
There are several regional planners established within South Carolina, but they 
serve different regions. SLED planners work within the CTCC regions. EMD planners 
serve within Fixed Nuclear Facility regions. Fire Service coordinators serve within the 
various fire regions. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 
planners serve within public health regions. All of these regions vary. No two state 
agencies have the same regions. The result is a county receiving at least five different 
planners trying to further the state strategy with varying players. This is not only very 
confusing to the counties themselves, but also to the planners trying to conduct planning 
meetings and explain why different regions exist. 
I. DISCUSSION 
Figure 11 represents the population of South Carolina. The darker counties are the 
most populous and if compared with the figures above, contain the most capabilities. 
Figure 11 highlights the importance of regional collaboration in the state. Because most  
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of the counties in the state have fewer than 100,000 people, most of them are not able to 
sustain all the capabilities needed to respond to a terrorist event or routine hazardous 
material spills. 
Figure 11.   South Carolina Population (2000) 
 
 
As seen in the previous regional structures, South Carolina has many regional 
structures by which state agencies, and other planning entities such as the COGs operate. 
However, due to overlap of planning regions, lack of coordination between various 
homeland security efforts such as specialized response teams, and recognition of the 
different regions, planning for homeland security has been impeded. The regions were 
created in silos without discussion of the implications to other agencies and planning. 
Within the CTCC regions, counties are being forced to work together when there is no 
natural relationship between them such as mutual aid agreements or similarities in 
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infrastructure or threat. As noted in the figures provided in this chapter, only two of the 
regional structures in the state align. Homeland security planning is being promoted by 
varying disciplines in each of these regions throughout the state, but without 
coordination. As a result, there is overlap in resources and plans. Because of this, there is 
a danger that plans will contradict each other. For example, the DHEC regions vary from 
the communications regions. DHEC personnel radios are programmed according to the 
communication regions; therefore, DHEC personnel cannot communicate with all of the 
hospitals in their region. Also, regional mass casualty plans for public health and 
hospitals are drafted within different regional structures than the counter-terrorism 
regions. During homeland security exercises, which are conducted within the counter-
terrorism regions, there is confusion as to how hospitals will coordinate when there are 
several different regional structures, some with coordinating hospitals outside of the 
counter-terrorism regions. Also, there are counter-terrorism planners within each of the 
counter-terrorism regions to further the mission of the homeland security strategy and 
draft regional plans. However, there are also planners with State Emergency Management 
Division who have very similar missions, but the regions in which they operate are 
different.  
Taking the next step in enhancing regional collaboration can ensure that the 
resources present in the various regions are aligned, know of each other’s capabilities, are 
integrated into county, regional, and state plans, and function in a more integrated 
fashion. Currently, team responsibilities and capabilities are unknown across the county 
and regional level. While the state is aware of most of the teams, their capabilities are 
ambiguous and they are not integrated into plans such as the State Emergency Operations 
Plan.  
Although regional assets and teams have been placed strategically throughout the 
state, as presented in the above graphics, there has been little to no planning to discuss 
how these teams will be integrated into a response when they are needed. There is no 
document that provides a regional concept of operations strategy for utilization of these 
teams. Several assets and resources have been placed throughout the regions in the state. 
Enhancing regional collaboration can ensure that these assets and resources are known, 
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there is a plan for the utilization of these resources, and that funding has been utilized in 
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IV. REGIONAL COLLABORATION THROUGHOUT THE 
NATION 
Regionally coordinated and planned programs are not new and have 
existed in such fields as transportation, health, environmental planning and 
so forth for many years. However, in contrast, homeland security is a 
relatively new program area, not emerging in prominence until after the 
terror attacks of September 11, 2001. Accordingly, new operating 
procedures regarding regional planning and response are necessary – a 
new paradigm shift in preparedness is necessary to meet current 
challenges.81 
In the National Preparedness Guidance, every state was encouraged to identify 
sub-state regions to support tiers within the Target Capabilities List. Many states and 
regionals throughout the nation have taken on regional collaboration and formed true 
regional partnerships, created strategic plans, and allocated funding on a regional basis. 
This chapter will identify three such cases – Iowa (Section A), Michigan (Section B), and 
Arizona (Section C) – to determine how they have achieved effective regional 
collaboration by addressing the impediments to regional collaboration as outlined in the 
literature. Section D will provide a brief overview of how additional states have enhanced 
regional collaboration, and Section E will provide a summary of these states’ efforts. The 
case study should provide lessons learned and allow some assessment of  how regional 
collaboration has been expanded across the country. As several sources have noted, there 
is no “one-size-fits-all” solution, nor did the federal government mandate that states form 
regions based on any specific criteria.  
As stated in previous chapters, regional collaboration can be measured only by the 
amount of regional planning, development of strategies, and other regional initiatives that 
have been developed, since there are presently no metrics for the effects of regional 
collaboration. Regional collaboration can be enhanced by having strong leadership and 
creating a sense of ownership within the regions. Impediments to regional collaboration, 
as documented by Howitt, include costs, turf wars, and creation of policy. This chapter 
will offer recommendations on how to overcome these impediments. The United States 
                                                 
81 “Emergency Management and Homeland Security Informational Letter,” Volume 06-12, March 30, 
2006, 3. 
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Government Accountability Office has stated that regional collaboration can be enhanced 
by developing mutually agreed upon goals and objectives, creation of strategic plans, and 
coordination of homeland security expenditures. States have promoted regional 
collaboration through funding, creation of specialized response teams, regional response 
plans, regional strategic plans, and the formation of regional taskforces. These efforts 
have assisted in fostering and expanding regional collaboration.  
Nearly every state identified in this chapter had some form of regional 
coordination councils, taskforces, or advisory councils. These councils are necessary to 
gain consensus on homeland security issues, develop plans, submit investment 
justifications for grant funding, and build a network of professionals that can further the 
homeland security mission by enhancing regional collaboration.  
A. ARIZONA 
Arizona, like Iowa and several other states, allocates homeland security funding 
primarily through regions. Its homeland security projects are initially approved and then 
prioritized by the Regional Advisory Councils before being sent to the state advisory 
council.82 The regions provide recommendations to how counties or other municipalities 
in the region should receive funding.83 Arizona, as ordered by state statute, has also 
created regional strategic plans that align with the state’s homeland security strategic 
plan.84 These strategies provide Arizona regions with a specific purpose, or mission, 
regional goals, objectives, review of capabilities, and a process to implement the strategy. 
By drafting strategies that align with the state’s strategy, regions are able to plan for how 
they will achieve preparedness. The collaboration required to develop these strategic 
plans is an added benefit to the actual plan.  
As outlined in Arizona’s State Statute, each regional council member serves for 
two terms and is recommended by those who sit on the state advisory council to the 
                                                 
82 “Arizona’s Regional Approach to Homeland Security,” 
http://www.azdohs.gov/documents/News/NR_051006_%20HS%20Regional%20Approach.pdf. Accessed 
December 26, 2007.   
83 ARS Title 41; Chapter 41 Arizona Department of Homeland Security, 
http://www.homelandsecurity.az.gov/documents/ARS%20Title%2041.pdf. Accessed December 18, 2006. 
84 Ibid. 
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governor for appointment. Arizona is required to have the following on their regional 
advisory councils: 
• A representative of a fire service from an urban or suburban area in that  
region; 
• A representative of a fire service from a rural area in the region; 
• A police chief; 
• A county sheriff; 
• A tribal representative; 
• An emergency manager; 
• A mayor; 
• A county supervisor; 
• Two at-large members (selected by representatives of the legislature on 
the state council); 
• A representative from the department of public safety; 
• A public health representative. 
 
Arizona has gone to great lengths to detail the requirements of the regional 
committees, who will appoint them, how long they will serve, and what their mission is, 
thereby minimizing confusion. This process allows for a standard, consistent 
methodology to be implemented across the state. The above listing of representatives is 
fairly comprehensive, but it does not incorporate the private sector. Stakeholders within 
the private sector are vital assets to homeland security. The protection of critical 
infrastructure is one of the National Priorities and it is important to incorporate 
stakeholders into the planning process. Also, since the Infrastructure Protection Program 
is part of the Office of Grants and Training, Department of HSGP, including the private 
sector would allow for a more comprehensive approach to all grant programs.  
Arizona’s regional structure is a good effort at enhancing regional collaboration. 
Arizona’s state statute not only mandates regional collaboration, but also provides 
specific guidance on how to structure the regions and what their mission is. In South 
Carolina, there is no such statute or mission for the regional councils. The CTCC regions 
within South Carolina are not specifically tasked with creating strategies or grant 
recommendations, and the committee make-up is very fluid. South Carolina should 
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examine how Arizona has implemented regional structures in the state and incorporated 
them into the planning process. Since South Carolina has regional organizations already 
established (CTCCs), it would not be difficult to direct them to develop a regional 
strategy that outlines their goals and objectives.  
B. MICHIGAN 
Michigan has taken several steps over the past years to develop a regional 
approach to homeland security. Since efforts began in 1999 to assess domestic 
preparedness, the state has adjusted its guidance, funding strategy, and disciplines 
represented on Local Planning Teams to stay in synch with national preparedness and 
grant guidance. The state recently establish seven Regional Homeland Security Planning 
Boards “to effectively coordinate planning in the four mission areas (i.e., prevent, protect, 
respond and recover) associated with the National Framework for Preparedness. The 
RHSPBs will serve as the focal point for managing the region’s prioritized capability 
enhancements, with a primary aim on achieving a more efficient use of funds and thereby 
increasing the return on investment.”85 These planning boards consist of, and are directly 
affected by, the local planning teams to ensure a bottom-up approach. The Local 
Planning Teams are multi-disciplined teams that represent all responder disciplines and 
programs in the county.  
Each Local Planning Team LPT), at a minimum, consists of the following 
discipline-related representatives: 
• 1 urban fire service representative (paid) 
• 1 rural fire service representative (volunteer) 
• 1 municipal law enforcement representative 
• 1 county law enforcement representative 
• 1 emergency management representative 
• 1 emergency medical service representative 
• 1 HazMat team representative 
• 1 public works representative 
• 1 public safety communications representative 
                                                 
85 “Emergency Management and Homeland Security Informational Letter,” 3. 
49 
• 1 governmental administrative representative (i.e., county commissioner, 
mayor, township supervisor, 
• school district superintendent) 
• 1 local public health representative 
• 1 health care (hospital, medical director, etc) 
• 1 tribal, if present in county 
• 1 private security 
• 1 cyber security 
 
These Local Planning Teams are required to have a chair, co-chair, and secretary. 
Each county Local Planning Team is allowed one seat on the Regional Homeland 
Security Planning Board. These Local Planning Teams have been utilized to assess 
capabilities, develop Regional Homeland Security Strategies, and based on these, create 
enhancement plans that will be submitted for federal homeland security funding. This 
method differs somewhat from Arizona’s in that enhancement plans are developed at the 
county level and then submitted to the regional level for approval and review.   
South Carolina has Needs Assessment Committees similar in function to the 
Local Planning Teams of Michigan. The Needs Assessment Committees are multi-
discipline, but only represent fire, law enforcement, emergency medical services, and 
emergency management. The Needs Assessments Committees were utilized in previous 
years’ homeland security grant funding (Fiscal Year 2003–Fiscal Year 2005) to 
determine how to allocate the county allocation for homeland security funding. However, 
since FY2006, county allocations have not been awarded to all of the state’s counties and 
the Needs Assessment Committees no longer meet or participate in planning. However, 
the Needs Assessment Chairman was recently added to the Regional CTCC membership. 
The continuous involvement and specific guidelines for Michigan’s Local Planning 
Teams should be incorporated into South Carolina’s Needs Assessment Committees. This 
would ensure that all counties are actively participating in keeping the state prepared. 
This would also expand regional collaboration within the state by re-engaging the Needs 
Assessment Committee members at the county level, adding other disciplines to the 
committee (as done in Michigan), and creating a sense of ownership in the state’s 
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homeland security efforts. As described in previous chapters, many of the smaller 
counties do not feel as though their voice is represented adequately due to all of the 
money now going only to the larger counties. This would allow the state to reach back 
out to the smaller counties, and re-enforce it within the larger counties, to let them know 
that the state wants, and needs their input, to ensure that all counties in the state have the 
necessary resources available (regionally) to prepare for a terrorist event.  
C. IOWA 
The state of Iowa regionalized by mirroring the Iowa Emergency Management 
Association, the Iowa State Association of Counties, and the Iowa Department of Public 
Health regional boundaries. Iowa utilizes these regions to administer grant funds and as 
an avenue to receive input for homeland security issues. Iowa provided a portion of the 
state allocated management and administration funds to each of the regions to manage the 
HSGP funds for the region. At the direction of the Governor, each region elected a 
Regional Homeland Security Board whose responsibilities are to select a chair and vice-
chair to facilitate meetings, develop bylaws for operation, select a fiscal entity to 
administer the grant funds, and determine funding priorities and allocations to develop 
and/or enhance capabilities.86 Iowa is one of the only states to have publicly documented 
how homeland security funds are awarded. Iowa provides a set amount of funding to each 
region to expand regional collaboration. 
Unfortunately, South Carolina does not have the luxury of three association or 
state agency regions aligning, as detailed in the previous chapter. This would solve many 
regional overlap problems at the state and county level. Iowa has placed much 
responsibility on the regions within the state. Unlike Arizona, the regions are allowed to 
select their own board. By allowing Iowa regions to select their own board, they address 
the GAO finding that taking “advantage of regional leadership or political relationships 
that can bring additional stakeholders, resources, or ideas to the process.”87  
In Iowa, regional projects are funded based on the regional population, critical 
asset score, and agricultural production value. This method truly supports the statement in 
the previous chapter that regions share not only the risk, but also the responsibility to 
                                                 
86 Implementation Plan for the Regionalization of Iowa Homeland Security, 5. 
87 Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, 20. 
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respond to that risk. Also, by combining risk elements and distributing funding to 
regional projects, Iowa is able to provide incentives for local jurisdictions to collaborate.  
The National Association of Development Organizations, which provides 
advocacy for these organizations, notes that according to a survey, “The most pressing 
homeland security need in small metropolitan and rural areas… is the need to provide 
incentives for regional cooperation among local jurisdictions.”88 South Carolina should 
utilize its existing regions to receive input into homeland security efforts, and should 
utilize a funding formula similar to that of Iowa to allocate homeland security grant 
funding to the regions.  
D. OTHER STATE EFFORTS TO EXPAND REGIONAL 
COLLABORATION 
On October 9, 2001, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) along 
with the Department of Emergency Management created seven Regional Domestic 
Security Task Forces.89 The task force is designed to enhance the detection of possible 
terrorist threats, facilitate the sharing of information, protect critical infrastructure by 
conducting security audits and vulnerability assessments, promote and oversee training 
and the purchase of equipment, and conduct public awareness campaigns. It is comprised 
of police chiefs, fire chiefs, emergency management directors, federals, state, and local 
officials, medical officers, and industry executives.  
The Florida regional system, including its homeland security governance 
structure, has been recognized in the homeland security discipline.90  During a recent 
Southeast Homeland Security Advisors meeting, Florida discussed how they had utilized 
the regions to aid in capabilities assessment. Similar to South Carolina, Florida’s 
Homeland Security Advisor is from the state law enforcement discipline and is appointed 
by the governor. Also similar to South Carolina, state law enforcement within Florida 
oversees homeland security, but works closely with state emergency management , which  
is responsible for responding to disasters. FDLE utilized the Domestic Security Taskforce 
regions to conduct capability assessments utilizing the Target Capabilities List. Also, 
                                                 
88 National Association of Development Organizations, “Regional Approaches to Homeland Security 
Planning & Preparedness,” August 2005. 
89 Regional Domestic Security Task Force, October 15, 2001.  
90 National Governors Association, “A Governor’s Guide to Homeland Security,” 2007, 23.  
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Florida has given these regions a specific tasking in enhancing the detection of terrorism 
via the steps mentioned above. Florida’s inclusion of industry executives in its task forces 
is also a good practice that should be implemented in achieving regional collaboration. 
Since the private sector owns 85% of the critical infrastructure in the nation, it is a key 
player in our efforts to implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.  
Pennsylvania allows counties to divide themselves into regions based on existing 
mutual aid agreements, rather than utilizing the structure of the state’s nine regional 
counterterrorism task forces established by the Pennsylvania Counterterrorism Planning, 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002.91 Despite the mandate as set forth in that 
legislation, Pennsylvania allowed the regional membership to determine its own 
structure. As supported by the Governmental Accountability Office and the National 
Preparedness Guidance, it is vital to allow jurisdictions to identify boundaries so that they 
can take advantage of existing regional relationships and re-assess the structure of the 
regions, as warranted, to ensure that the proper structure is in place.92,93 Utilizing mutual 
aid agreements is one way to determine regional structure. Pennsylvania appears to be the 
only state in which regional stakeholders are allowed to determine their own regions. The 
process of establishing regions and then verifying those regions via analysis of other 
regional structure options is the second step of defining the appropriate regional structure 
as identified in the National Preparedness Guidance. Allowing stakeholders to identify 
their own regions increases regional collaboration, as noted in a Governmental 
Accountability Organization report.94 Other states should emulate Pennsylvania and 
examine their mandated, or un-mandated, regional structures to determine whether those 
structures have “buy-in” from the member counties, and if it is the best regional structure 
by which to promote collaboration. This would follow recommendations of not only the 
Governmental Accountability Office, but also the National Preparedness Guidance.   
In Texas and Connecticut, the COGs serve as the regional planning structures for 
the state. The COGs also play “a key role in facilitating emergency preparedness 
                                                 
91 Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, 14. 
92 Ibid., 20. 
93 National Preparedness Guidance, 22. 
94 Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness. 
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coordination and integrating preparedness plans.”95 COG regions are a good place to start 
when determining regional structure, because they often have completed regional 
planning projects, such as economic or transportation initiatives, and have in-depth 
knowledge of the resources and cohesiveness throughout the region. Because of their 
extensive planning knowledge, the COGs should be included as members of regional 
councils.   
Enhancing regional collaboration is important to building capabilities, as 
demonstrated by North Dakota, which created anchor communities to serve as cities that 
could ensure an effective level of response to a CBRNE incident.96 Similar to South 
Carolina’s COBRA team communities (or counties), these anchor communities have the 
resources to sustain preparedness efforts such as response teams.  
The National Capital Region (NCR), which consists of Arlington, Loudoun, 
Fairfax, and Prince William counties and the City of Alexandria in Virginia; 
Montgomery and Prince George’s counties in Maryland; and the District of Columbia, is 
a critical area for the United States and therefore has its own Office within the 
Department of Homeland Security. The Homeland Security Act established the Office of 
National Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC) within DHS to “oversee and coordinate 
federal programs for, and relationships with, federal, state, local, and regional authorities 
in the NCR.”97 The ONCRC is specifically tasked with coordination of federal 
emergency preparedness programs, including terrorism, in the region for federal, state, 
local, and private entities, and assessing the progress of such programs within the NCR. 
The NCR expands collaboration between two states and the District of Columbia. While 
the oversight of a federal department is not realistic for every sub-state region, the 
oversight committees of the state, such as the South Carolina State CTCC, should utilize 
the same oversight power and strategies to ensure that State regions are expanding 
regional collaboration. The State CTCCs should review the regions’ plans to enhance 
                                                 
95  Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, 14. 
96 Susan K. Reinertson, Resource Sharing, Building Collaboration for Regionalization, 25. 
97 Homeland Security, Coordinating Planning and Standards Needed to Better Manage First 
Responder Grants in the National Capital Region (Washington D.C: United States Government 
Accountability Office, June 24, 2004), 4. 
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preparedness, evaluate their response capabilities, and provide documented public reports 
on successes and recommendation to enhance collaboration within the regions.  
There are several other documents, including the Alliance for Regional 
Stewardship’s Regional Emergency Preparedness Compacts: Safeguarding the Nation’s 
Community and Susan K. Reinertson’s Thesis entitled Resource Sharing, Building 
Collaboration for Regionalization that discuss regionalization efforts throughout the 
nation. The effectiveness of regional collaboration has not been measured in any of these 
reports. However, several effective solutions such as anchor communities and regional 
planning commissions can be derived from the variety of strategies used to expand 
regional collaboration.  
E. SUMMARY 
Many of the methods employed by other states to expand regional collaboration 
can be applied to South Carolina. South Carolina has several regional teams in place, and 
has established regional coordination councils, but the regions have not developed 
homeland security strategies, or regional response plans. However, even with the regional 
initiatives that South Carolina has implemented, lessons learned from other states should 
be applied to further enhance the function of these initiatives. As in Arizona, specific 
guidance should be given to the Regional CTCCs on their mission and assigned 
responsibilities such as developing regional strategies. Michigan has utilized and nurtured 
local planning groups that are now making impacts are the regional level. Iowa has 
allowed regions to elect their own leadership. South Carolina should re-energize the 
county committees to incorporate them as stakeholders in regional initiatives. The next 
chapter will examine specific recommendation and implementation steps on how to 
effectively utilize lessons learned from other states to enhance regional collaboration.  
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V. ENHANCING REGIONAL COLLABORATION IN SOUTH 
CAROLINA 
South Carolina has several regional teams that would be available to respond to 
and support the response to a CBRNE/WMD event; it also has a statewide 
communications system that allows for interoperability. South Carolina must, however, 
still work towards enhancing regional collaboration. This chapter will outline how South 
Carolina can expand and enhance regional collaboration utilizing strategies from existing 
states and addressing issues found in the literature. This chapter will outline how South 
Carolina can expand and enhance regional collaboration utilizing strategies from existing 
states, as discussed in Chapter IV, and addressing issues found in the literature, as 
discussed in Chapters I and II. Arizona, Michigan, and Iowa have taken specific, 
documented steps to expanding regional collaboration. All three states have clearly 
identified regional roles and responsibilities, involved the regions directly in the 
Homeland Security Grant funding process, and provided clear focus for the purpose of 
the regions. Although methods and legislation introduced and utilized in other states may 
not be entirely applicable to South Carolina, actions taken in other states to expand 
regional collaboration can be applied in whole or in part to the state. Michigan has very 
similar committee structures at the county and regional level, similar to South Carolina. 
While legislation may not be adopted, as in Arizona, there are still specific 
recommendations, such as providing specific term limits for committee chairs and 
development of regional strategies, that can be implemented in the state to enhance 
regional collaboration. Iowa provides funding based on population, critical assets, and 
agriculture production value within regions. Agriculture is South Carolina’s second 
largest industry, tourism being first, and a model utilizing methodology similar to Iowa’s 
could be applied to the state. Specific recommendations that South Carolina can 
implement are to develop regional strategies, re-engage the Needs Assessment 
Committees, restructure homeland security grant funding in the state, and establish 
requirements for the Regional CTCCs. These steps will aid in increasing leadership, 
stakeholder involvement, and effective utilization of homeland security grant funding. 
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Although regional collaboration “makes sense,” it has not been fully implemented 
in South Carolina. A basic structure is there, but the current geographic makeup of the 
region, and lack of planning, guidance, and motivation has left the Regional CTCCs with 
a frail backbone and no true substance. In order for the Regional CTCCs to enhance 
collaboration, there are significant challenges that must be addressed at both the state and 
regional level. The information presented here will guide the regions in enhancing 
collaboration by enabling them to regionally prepare for and respond to a disaster.  
SLED serves as the State Administrative Agency for the HSGP, and the Chief of 
SLED is the Homeland Security Advisor who co-chairs the State CTCC with the State 
Emergency Management Director. These two agencies are key to implementing the 
recommendations set forth in this thesis. SLED is fundamental in ensuring that the state’s 
Homeland Security Strategy is implemented along with the National Priorities, including 
expanding regional collaboration. While SLED is not the only state agency involved in 
Homeland Security, it is ultimately held accountable for the monies obligated within the 
state as the State Administrative Agency. It should continue to take the initiative, 
ensuring that all monies have been allocated efficiently and effectively in that regionally 
designated resources and assets are known, incorporated into plans, and that regional 
capabilities have been built across the state. Other stakeholders in this initiative include 
the local units of government that are represented currently on the Regional CTCCs and 
county Needs Assessment Committees. Their involvement will be described later in this 
process.  
A. IMPLEMENTATION STEPS 
1. Increasing Stakeholder Involvement 
a. Key Stakeholders 
Depending on the region and the amount of involvement desired, key 
leaders from the public and private sector should be involved in expanding regional 
collaboration. Law Enforcement, Fire, Emergency Medical Services, Emergency 
Management, Government, Private and Public Health Care, private utilities, public 
works, community/volunteer groups, and academics are a few of the disciplines that may 
be represented on a regional homeland security council. In general, representation from 
the four basic services of law enforcement, EMS, emergency management, and fire are 
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represented. There is little doubt why these key disciplines should be involved in 
homeland security planning. They are the true first responders and will be the first ones to 
arrive on the scene of a terrorist attack or natural hazard event.  
Because of the criticality of critical infrastructure and plans associated 
with those critical infrastructure/key resources, the inclusion of the private sector, 
including private utilities, is vital in homeland security planning. There is a disconnect 
between the private sector and the public sector throughout the nation.  Not including the 
private sector in planning can cause confusion and distrust. The Buffer Zone Protection 
Plan Program is designed to bring together critical infrastructure owners and/or operators 
and the first responder community. The result of the BZPP process are Buffer Zone Plans 
that are “intended to help local law enforcement and first responders develop effective 
preventive measures that make it more difficult for terrorists to plan or launch attacks 
from the immediate vicinity of high priority infrastructure targets.”98 Therefore, it is vital 
for the private sector to be involved in the state and regional homeland security process 
so that a relationship is developed and trust is gained.  
As pointed out in the previous chapters, leadership is key to enhancing 
regional collaboration. The leadership should consist of representatives from all 
disciplines involved in homeland security planning, including the private sector. It is 
important that the private sector be involved in preparedness planning. One way to ensure 
that all agencies responsible for homeland security are involved in planning efforts is to 
examine documents that detail responsibilities. The Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) 
will be used during disasters (natural and man-made) to lay out responsibilities and roles. 
Table 1 details the primary agencies that are responsible for each of the Emergency 
Support Functions in an EOP at both the state and county level.   
                                                 
98 Fiscal Year 2005 Buffer Zone Protection Program: Program Guidelines and Application Kit 
(Washington D.C: United States Department of Homeland Security, 2004), 10. 
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ESF State Responsible Agency County Responsible Agency
ESF-1 Transportation Department of Transportation County School Bus Director 
ESF-2 Communications Budget and Control Board, 




ESF-3 Public Works and 
Engineering 
Budget and Control Board, 
Division of Procurement Services 
Assistant County 
Administrator for Public 
Works 
ESF-4 Firefighting Forestry Commission – Wildland 
Fires 
Department of Labor, Licensing, 
and Regulation; Division of Fire 
and Life Safety – Structural Fires 
President, County Fire 
Chief’s Association 
ESF-5 Information and 
Planning 
SC Emergency Management 
Division, OTAG 
County Director of 
Emergency Management 
ESF-6 Mass Care Department of Social Services County Director of 
Department of Social 
Services 
ESF-7 Resource Support Budget and Control Board, 
Division of Procurement Services 
County Purchasing Agent 
ESF-8 Health and 
Medical Services 
Department of Health and 
Environmental Control 
Department of Health and 
Environmental Control, 
Health Department 
ESF-9 Search and 
Rescue 
Department of Labor, Licensing, 
and Regulation; Division of Fire 
and Life Safety – Structural Fires 
President, County Fire 
Chief’s Association, Fire 
Rescue Liaison, EMS 





Department of Health and 
Environmental Control 
President, County Fire 
Chief’s Association 
ESF-11 Food Services Department of Social Services County Food Services 
Director 
ESF-12 Energy Office of Regulatory Staff County Department of 
Public Works 





SC Emergency Management 
Division, OTAG 















Clemson University Livestock – 
Poultry Health 
County Codes Enforcement 
ESF-18 Donated Goods 
and Volunteer 
Services 
Budget and Control Board, 





Military Support SC National Guard, OTAG  
 
South Carolina does have a majority of the agencies represented both on 
the CTCC, as depicted in Table 1,and in the State’s Emergency Operations Plan; certain 
important  agencies such as the Forestry Commission and the SC National Guard are not 
represented on the State or Regional CTCC. In order to enhance collaboration and 
support coordination, a crosswalk should be developed to ensure that all agencies that 
serve as leads within the State EOP are also represented on the CTCC. The State EOP is 
all- hazards and therefore all agencies responsible for emergency support functions may 
be called upon during a terrorist event. In fact, the Forestry Commission is leading the 
effort for the Incident Command Teams being established within the state.  
The South Carolina State Homeland Security Strategy is designed to guide 
the state’s mission and goals for building preparedness for all hazards, with a focus on 
terrorism. Within the strategy, goals and objectives are defined to build capability within 
the state. The South Carolina National Guard, an asset to the state, is not mentioned in the 
strategy. It is not clear if this exclusion is an oversight or intentional omission. Other 
states have included the National Guard in their homeland security organizations and 
referenced it as a support – or even lead –  role in their Homeland Security Strategies. 
South Carolina has done none of the above. The Guard would provide transparency to 
federal assets as well as ensure that state Guard assets were being utilized to their fullest 
extent. Also, the Guard has several subject matter experts who could add to the homeland 
security mission in South Carolina. Although the South Carolina National Guard 
performs both federal and state missions, it should be integrated into the planning process 
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for homeland security in South Carolina, and as such, integrated into the State Homeland 
Security Strategy and Counter Terrorism Coordinating Council.  
Effective regional collaboration requires leadership and stakeholder 
involvement. “Leadership dedicated to stakeholder involvement is a critical characteristic 
of high-performing partnerships, second only to achieving results.”99  “Allowing all 
stakeholders to jointly name and frame…issues for regional collaboration is important for 
one simple reason – to foster ownership and commitment. Since no single institution or 
entity is responsible or has the authority to address a multi-jurisdictional problem, the 
issues and potential solutions must reflect the interests and viewpoints of people that have 
a stake in the issue, those who are needed to implement any potential outcome, and those 
that might feel compelled to challenge the process or its outcome.”100   
b. Needs Assessment Committees  
South Carolina’s County Needs Assessment Committees should be re-
energized and expanded to support local planning efforts. Similar to Michigan’s Local 
Planning Teams, the Needs Assessment Committees membership should be expanded to 
include:  
• 1 urban fire service representative (paid), if applicable 
• 1 rural fire service representative (volunteer), if applicable 
• 1 municipal law enforcement representative 
• 1 county law enforcement representative 
• 1 emergency management representative 
• 1 emergency medical service representative 
• 1 HazMat team representative, if applicable 
• 1 public works representative 
• 1 public safety communications representative 
• 1 governmental administrative representative (i.e., county 
commissioner, mayor, township supervisor, 
• school district superintendent) 
• 1 local public health representative 
                                                 
99 Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, 23. 
100 University of Montana, Public Policy Research Institute, “Planning Across Boundaries: Habits of 
Effective Regional Collaboration,” (February 26, 2006), 2. 
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• 1 health care (hospital, medical director, etc) 
• 1 tribal, if present in county 
• 1 private security 
• 1 cyber security 
 
This expansion would ensure that all homeland security efforts, including 
efforts supported by other programs such as the Centers for Disease Control Public 
Health Emergency Preparedness program and the Heath Resources and Services 
Administration Bioterrorism Preparedness program, by expanding the knowledge base 
within the committee. This would ultimately create a more efficient method of requesting 
grant funding. Grant guidance strongly suggests that programs such as those listed above 
and the HSGP support and complement each other. By expanding the Needs Assessment 
Committees, all program efforts could be drafted at the grass-roots level. In order to keep 
the Needs Assessment Committees engaged, they should be heavily involved in the 
drafting of the regional strategy and requests for grant funding. Also, the Needs 
Assessment Committees should become more involved in determining risk within their 
county. As subject matter experts about the critical infrastructure, threat, vulnerability, 
consequence, and other risk factors, this committee would be very valuable in providing 
information.  
c. Regional Counter Terrorism Coordinating Councils 
Currently, the leadership at the regional level is seeking guidance to find a 
specific mission for the councils.  Regional CTCC chairs have been unable to provide 
guidance to their councils on the development of a mission or strategic plans to create a 
sense of purpose within the councils. The lack of mission has created stagnancy within 
the councils. The regional councils are becoming less involved in homeland security 
planning and are only meeting when new guidance on funding is released. Also, there are 
not strategic plans at the regional level to guide preparedness efforts or requests for 
funding.   
The Regional Counter Terrorism Coordinating Councils are the key 
stakeholders for expanding regional collaboration. The regional councils provide an 
avenue for collaboration and coordination and should be taken advantage of. By 
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developing mission statements, providing them more fiscal responsibility in relation to 
grant funding decisions, and clearly establishing roles and responsibilities of the council, 
these regional councils would ensure that issues not only at the state level, but also at the 
regional and local level are known, identified, and addressed in a regional strategy. 
Engaging regional councils will not only ensure that grant funds are expended in an 
efficient and effective matter, but they can also be utilized for other homeland security 
projects such as identifying critical infrastructure to quantify risk and implementation of 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS).   
Arizona’s specificity for its regional advisory councils should be mirrored 
in South Carolina. The state should update its Regional CTCC membership roster, make 
it clear how the members are elected, and set term limits. Also, the requirement of the 
Regional Strategies will allow for greater coordination and collaboration within the 
region.  
2. Develop Regional Strategic Plans  
The CTCC regions should be required to develop regional strategies that tie to the 
state’s Homeland Security Strategy. The creation of a strategy would fix many of the 
impediments to regional collaboration at the regional level currently. The development of 
a strategy would aid in defining a mission and objectives, and create a road map for how 
the region could enhance collaboration and homeland security efforts. The mission 
statement of the State CTCC could be utilized as a guide, or starting point, for the 
region’s mission. Also, the questions “How prepared do we need to be?,” “How prepared 
are we?,” and “How do we prioritize efforts to close the gap?” could be utilized as a 
starting point for determining what should be addressed in the strategy.  
Developing a regional strategy would allow the region to determine its own 
requirements for how best to protect its resources and boundaries. This would also give 
the counties within the region more of a sense of ownership within the region. 
Developing a strategy will take much time and collaboration between all stakeholders. 
This process will encourage all stakeholders to provide input. By taking a more active 
role in obtaining preparedness funding, local governments will be more involved. The 
involvement of all stakeholders will allow them to become more familiar with each other,  
thereby creating a sense of trust and understanding of each other’s needs and capabilities.   
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Regional Strategies provide a guidebook for how the region wants to address 
homeland security issues including preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. A 
regional strategy is not only valuable for addressing grant requests via Investment 
Justifications and Enhancement Plans, but it allows for the region to have an all-hazard, 
multi-discipline, multi-jurisdictional plan defining goals and objectives towards 
enhancing regional collaboration and all homeland security efforts.  
3. Involve Regions in Funding Decisions 
Once a regional strategy has been developed, it can serve as a road map to create 
investment and enhancement plans that can be used to apply for funding. The funding 
decisions are based on identified gaps from the capability assessment that was conducted 
as a requirement of the FY2006 Homeland Security Grant Program. This capability 
assessment was conducted in South Carolina on a county basis and then 
verified/normalized at a regional level. However, the regions had little input on the 
allocation of funds once the state received the grant award. Involving the regions in 
funding recommendations would allow the process to come full circle: the regions would 
not only evaluate the capability gaps, but also provide recommendations on how to best 
mitigate those gaps within their region. The regions have more vision on their 
assets/resources than the state does and can therefore make more informed and effective 
recommendations on allocation for funding.  Also, regional initiatives could be formed at 
the regional level and in doing so, receive more buy-in. Currently, many of the regional 
initiative, while valiant efforts to address identified gaps statewide, have struggled due to 
lack of understanding and buy-in at the regional level.  
By increasing regional involvement in funding recommendations, regions will be 
able to determine for themselves how best to utilize homeland security funding. Federal 
guidance has suggested that a regional structure be used to distribute homeland security 
funding. Similar to Arizona, the regions should develop and prioritize their grant 
requests. SLED should take initiative to ensure that all monies have been allocated wisely 
and that regional capabilities, including plans that incorporate those capabilities, are 




own requests for homeland security grant funding, SLED will be able to ensure that those 
with the most knowledge of what their needs are the same ones developing grant 
requests. 
4. Long-Term 
A regional preparedness structure should be agreed upon so that planning is 
streamlined and consistent throughout the state. If this is not possible, it is essential that 
there is clarity on all regional preparedness efforts. The regional CTCCs should serve as 
the window to these regional preparedness efforts. The CTCCs should consist of regions 
that are naturally aligned via existing mutual aid agreement or planning areas. Also, the 
regional CTCCs should be given specific missions so that they are more functional.  
The lack of true regional collaboration within the state has caused confusion and 
frustration at all levels within the state. SLED should take the lead for homeland security 
in the state and mandate that regions be aligned to promote regional collaboration and 
homeland security planning. Objective 2.2 of the State Homeland Security Strategy, 
“Improve State, Regional, and local capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks employing 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive devices, infectious disease 
outbreaks, public health threats, and other emergencies,” involves all disciplines 
coordinating and planning on the regional level. Therefore, SLED should work with other 
state agencies to align planning regions and employ its homeland security planners to 
ensure that coordination is taking place not only within the regions, but among the state 
agencies as well. This will take considerable political buy-in among the key leaders in the 
state. There are significant turf issues between state agencies concerning homeland 
security planning. For example, the State EMD (which once was the SAA for the HSGP) 
and SLED (the current SAA) have difficulty in aligning homeland security planning 
initiatives and determining roles and responsibilities. The current “divide” for 
preparedness efforts is that SLED will handle all terrorism preparedness and EMD will 
handle all other hazards preparedness. This results in silos, gaps, and uncoordinated 
efforts to address many of the same issues, such as notification, evacuation, sheltering, 
etc. The State of Iowa regionalized its local jurisdictions into homeland security regions 
mirroring the districts used by the Iowa Emergency Managers Association, the Iowa State 
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Association of Counties, and the Iowa Department of Public Health.101 South Carolina 
should examine the regional districts and determine a similar, if not exact, regional 
structure by which homeland security regions could be coordinated better. 
Some of the regions, such as the Fixed Nuclear Facility regions, as noted in 
Figure 4, are based on the location of nuclear power plants and are structured according 
the emergency planning zones around those plants; therefore, it would be difficult to 
change these planning regions. Also, extensive efforts have been made to draft mass 
casualty plans for the DHEC regions. Efforts should be made within leadership within the 
state to identify regional plans and determine the most suitable structure by which to 
align homeland security preparedness efforts. Restructuring all of the regions in the state 
is not a realistic goal for the short-term. Extensive efforts across the state have occurred, 
but in silos. The varying regional structures overlap in planning efforts making it difficult 
to expand regional collaboration.  
SLED, as the SAA and the Homeland Security Advisor, should create one 
standard planning region by which all matters concerning Homeland Security are 
coordinated. The homeland security planners at SLED should have knowledge, not 
oversight, of other planning initiatives being conducted within their respective regions. 
They should be the coordinators of plans to ensure that goals are being achieved. 
However, SLED must be objective when determining which regional structure to utilize. 
The SLED regions, or CTCC regions, are the largest regions (some up to thirteen 
counties), and while South Carolina is not a large state, a large number of counties are 
difficult to coordinate. As the National Preparedness Goal states, regions should be 
“located in whole or in part within a designated planning radius of a core high threat 
urban area.” While the CTCC regions are centered around the four largest population 
centers in the state, the range of counties around those regions is too large to coordinate 
planning and/or enhance regional collaboration. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of these implementation steps is to enhance regional collaboration. 
In order to align with federal guidance and due to continually decreasing homeland 
security funds, more effective and efficient regional coordination is necessary. While the                                                  
101 Implementation Plan for the Regionalization of Iowa Homeland Security, November 2004. 
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state has made significant strides in developing regional councils, teams, and other 
capabilities, strategic plans are needed to guide these councils, plans are needed to 
integrate teams into responses, and regions as a whole are needed to become more 
involved in securing the state. Currently, state agencies such as SLED and EMD are the 
leads in regional planning and allocating funding at the regional level.  “Regionally 
coordinated and planned programs are not new and have existed in such fields as 
transportation, health, environmental planning and so forth for many years. However, in 
contrast, homeland security is a relatively new program area, not emerging in prominence 
until after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. Accordingly, new operating 
procedures regarding regional planning and response are necessary – a new paradigm 
shift in preparedness is necessary to meet current challenges.”102 
The above recommendations could be implemented easily and quickly in South 
Carolina. There are no major impediments to tying grant funding to the regions, re-
energizing the county Needs Assessment Committees, and providing guidelines that are 
more specific for the regional CTCCs. However, over the long term, South Carolina 
should examine its many different regional structures (especially between the State 
Emergency Management Division and the SLED).  
The current homeland security regional efforts for South Carolina versus the 
proposed homeland security regional efforts are displayed in Figure 1. The criteria 
assessed for this included leadership, stakeholder involvement, effective utilization of 
funds, capability building, focus integration of plans, alignment to federal guidance, and 
mutual aid agreements. Research has shown that with the guidance of strong leaderships, 
regions can have a more coherent structure and function more collaboratively.  
                                                 
102 “Emergency Management and Homeland Security Informational Letter,” 3. 
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Figure 12.   Expanding Regional Collaboration within the Homeland Security Regions 
 
C. IMPLEMENTATION HURDLES 
In order to address the cognitive hurdles, an examination of current federal 
guidance should occur. Regional collaboration is a national priority and involvement of 
local governments is highly recommended. A further examination of why the regional 
COBRA teams were not utilized during the Graniteville train accident, for example, 
should occur. Elements of only three of the fourteen COBRA teams were not utilized, but 
federal assets, such as the pre-positioned equipment pods, were.  
The regions should be motivated by the need to determine their own fate and 
determine how their homeland security money will be utilized. During a disaster, they 
will be the first to respond and should therefore become more engaged in the decision-
making and planning process. Due to a decrease in funding, regional initiatives are 
necessary to ensure preparedness across all areas. Also, regional programs are favored in 




















The regional councils and teams (including equipment) are already in place, 
therefore not requiring additional expenditures. Also, there are planners at the state and 
local level that are available to assist in planning and development of strategies. In order 
to overcome political hurdles, an all-hazards approach should be encouraged and 
documented as such in the State Strategy. This would encourage all grant funding 
including EMPG, fire grants, and public health programs to become integrated and 
support one strategy. Also, clear definitions of how council members are elected would 
mitigate political hurdles. In order to ensure that all stakeholders are consulted, 
involvement of all counties (small and large) in the planning process should be mandated 
to receive preparedness funding.  
Regional governance was included as an impediment to regional collaboration in 
Chapter I. Throughout the research, there was only one mention of a regional governance 
structure in Oregon. Also, all of the states opted for adopting regional advisory councils 
and/or committees to guide implementation of regional initiatives. Throughout the 
research, there was no mention of forming regional governments in order to enhance 
regional collaboration. Without regional governments, states have been able to 
successfully enhance regional collaboration through creation of regional councils, 
regional strategies, and funding regional initiatives. These regional councils have been 
successful in building regional capacities, including regional teams, and involving 
regional and local stakeholders in allocating grant funding and drafting regional 
strategies.    
D. SUMMARY 
The steps outlined in the implementation plan section of this chapter, increasing 
stakeholder involvement, developing regional strategic plans, and involving regions in 
funding decisions, should be implemented to promote regional collaboration throughout 
the state. Due to the threats that abound and the numerous preparedness programs being 
funded throughout the state, it is critical that all preparedness assets be coordinated at the 
regional level. The State of South Carolina, and specifically SLED, can enhance regional 
collaboration by requiring the regional councils to develop strategic plans and draft 
regional investment and enhancement justification plans, re-engage the Needs 
Assessment Committees, and creating a clearer system of how regional councils are 
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structured. These efforts will increase leadership and stakeholder involvement, align 
more with federal guidance, provide for more effective use of preparedness funds, and 
ultimately create a more prepared state. 
Expanding regional collaboration is essential to ensuring that all areas are capable 
of being prepared for a terrorist, or natural hazard event. Because not every jurisdiction or 
county can have all the resources needed to prepare for terrorism, sharing of resources 
and regional planning in support of regional collaboration is necessary. To support the 
National Preparedness Goal, the State Homeland Security Strategy, and to ensure that 
South Carolina is prepared, regional collaboration must be enhanced to prepare for a 



























South Carolina is committed to ensuring that each region of the state has an 
effective homeland security preparedness and response system.  Enhancing regional 
collaboration is the key to ensuring sustainable and sustained homeland security efforts. 
The state has been building regional capabilities since September 11, 2001. However, 
there is still much work to be done to effectively and efficiently enhance regional 
collaboration and ensure that homeland security efforts are aligned throughout, despite 
the agency or grant funding them. There are several ongoing, overlapping, uncoordinated 
efforts to enhance homeland security in the state. Although these efforts have been 
conducted in isolation, there are currently efforts underway via local catastrophic 
planners, the regional CTCCs, local Needs Assessment Committees, and other planning 
councils to begin to assign roles and responsibilities for homeland security and 
coordination of response assets. The recommendations provided in Chapter V provide for 
a more coordinative, collaborative use of homeland security dollars as well as planning 
and operational components of homeland security.  
To enhance homeland security efforts, regional strategies should be developed to 
provide the regions an all-hazards, multi-discipline, multi-jurisdictional plan by 
addressing the three questions of “How prepared do we need to be?,” “How prepared are 
we?,” and “How do we prioritize efforts to close the gap?”103 Leadership and 
stakeholders within the state should be re-engaged to ensure that homeland security 
efforts, other than funding, are being addressed at the local and regional level. Also, with 
the funding that is available, efforts should be made to ensure that regional committees 
are heavily involved in the decision-making process of grant allocations. This will 
increase stakeholder involvement and improve overall homeland security preparedness 
efforts within the regions.  
This thesis has outlined specific recommendations for South Carolina to expand 
regional collaboration through examining three other states, as case studies, to determine 
how they have expanded and enhanced regional collaboration to improve their homeland 
                                                 
103 National Preparedness Guidance, 3. 
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security preparedness efforts. It is important to note that these recommendations may also 
be applied to other states homeland security systems throughout the nation. While each 
state is unique with respect to assets, resources, population, etc., the recommendations  
can be applied universally. While there is not a one-size-fits-all, or standard, approach to 
expanding regional collaboration, there are key elements that will enhance regional 
collaboration including:  
• stakeholder involvement  
• creation of regional strategic plans  
• funding of regionally-elected initiatives.  
While the processes outlined in this thesis can be directly applicable to the HSGP, 
the product of expanding collaboration is the alignment of plans, more effective 
utilization of resources, and ultimately, a more comprehensive prepared nation. 
Expanding regional collaboration has been identified as a national priority and as such, 
should be implemented and expanded upon in its fullest capacity possible to ensure that 
the state is better prepared for future events, terrorist or natural-hazard related. 
“Expanded regional collaboration supports the development of a seamless, national 
network of mutually-supporting capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and 
recover from the full spectrum of threats and hazards.”104 With a decrease in federal 
preparedness funding, it is vital that states, and the nation as a whole, embrace regional 
collaboration to ensure that existing assets are utilized effectively and that communities 
work together to face the terrorism, and natural hazard threat. Catastrophic disasters are 
limited by jurisdiction boundaries; therefore, expanding regional collaboration is vital to 
ensuring that states, and the nation as a whole, are prepared.  
                                                 
104 National Preparedness Guidance, 19.  
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